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THE TERMS OF THE DEBATE: LITIGATION,        
ARGUMENTATIVE STRATEGIES, AND COALITIONS 
IN THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE STRUGGLE 
MARY ZIEGLER?
ABSTRACT
Why, in the face of ongoing criticism, do advocates of same-sex marriage continue to 
pursue litigation? Recently, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, a challenge to California’s ban on 
same-sex marriage, and Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, a lawsuit challenging 
section three of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, have created divisive debate. Leading 
scholarship and commentary on the litigation of decisions like Perry and Gill have been 
strongly critical, predicting that it will produce a backlash that will undermine the same-
sex marriage cause.  
 These studies all rely on a particular historical account of past same-sex marriage 
decisions and their effect on political debate. According to this account, the primary effect 
of same-sex marriage litigation has been the mobilization of conservative opponents of 
the cause. Groups like the Family Research Council and Focus on the Family successfully 
organized efforts to elect opponents of same-sex marriage and to introduce state constitu-
tional bans.  
 However, the historical account underlying these criticisms of same-sex marriage litiga-
tion is fundamentally incomplete. Leading studies have missed important effects, such as 
advocacy groups using judicial decisions on same-sex marriage as opportunities to change 
the rhetorical strategies and coalitions that define the debate. National gay rights groups 
like the Freedom to Marry Coalition and the Human Rights Campaign responded to 
important same-sex marriage decisions by stressing equality-based claims. Socially 
conservative organizations like the Family Research Council increasingly emphasized 
religious freedom or parental rights. At the same time, seemingly because of the decisions, 
alliances shifted. Labor and libertarian groups played a less central role while civil rights 
groups began shaping the alliances on either side. These developments may well prove to be 
favorable to the same-sex marriage cause. 
 At this point it is difficult to assess whether the changes studied here will benefit the 
same-sex marriage movement in the long term. However, without studying all the effects of 
same-sex marriage litigation, current conclusions about its value are premature and poten-
tially flawed. Litigation might prove to have been much more strategically advisable than 
some current scholarship suggests. At the very least, the litigation campaign should be 
judged not by an incomplete historical account but by an assessment of its full impact.
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I. INTRODUCTION
 Why, in the face of ongoing criticism, do advocates continue to 
pursue same-sex marriage litigation? Recently, high profile cases like 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger,1 a challenge to California’s ban on same-sex 
marriage, and Gill v. Office of Personnel Management,2 a lawsuit 
challenging section three of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, have 
created divisive debate.3 Leading scholarship and commentary on the 
litigation of past decisions like Perry and Gill have been powerfully 
critical, predicting that future litigation would produce a backlash 
that would undermine the same-sex marriage cause.4 Women’s and 
gender studies Professor John D’Emilio has argued that “the most 
significant outcome of [same-sex marriage] litigation has been the 
negative legislative and voter response that the [litigation of same-
sex marriage cases has] elicited.”5 Gerald Rosenberg, a law professor 
at the University of Chicago, claims that, “given the federal Defense 
of Marriage Act and the legal barriers in forty-five states, [one can 
argue that] proponents of same-sex marriage would have been better 
off never having litigated in the first place.”6 Michael Klarman, a 
Harvard Law School professor and legal historian, asserts that the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Goodridge v. 
 1.  704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). For an analysis of the earlier evolution of 
Perry, see William Eskridge, Jr. & Darren Spedale, Who Will Win the Gay Marriage Trial? 
A Road Map to the Routes to Victory for Both Sides, SLATE (Jan. 29, 2010, 10:45 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2242957. For examples of recent coverage of Perry, see Michael 
Doyle, Justice Kennedy’s the One to Watch on Gay Marriage Test, MCCLATCHY NEWSPA-
PERS, Aug. 7, 2010, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/08/07/98790/justice-kennedys-the-
one-to-watch.html; Megan Friedman, After Prop. 8 Trial, What’s Next?, TIME NEWSFEED
(Aug. 5, 2010), http://newsfeed.time.com/2010/08/05/after-prop-8-trial-whats-next; Raisa 
Habersham, Opposing Groups Plan Proposition 8 Rallies, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 6, 
2010, 2:57 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/opposing-groups-plan-proposition-586478.html.
 2.  699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). For an overview of the filings and decisions 
thus far issued in Gill, see Our Work—Gill et al. v. Office of Personnel Management et al.,
GLAD, http://www.glad.org/work/cases/gill-v-office-of-personnel-management/ (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2012).   
 3.  For coverage of the debate produced by Perry and Gill, see, for example, Gabriel 
Arana, Gay on Trial: Why More than Marriage is at Stake in the Federal Legal Challenge to 
Prop. 8, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Dec. 2009, at 16; Margaret Talbot, States Rule, THE 
NEW YORKER ONLINE NEWS DESK (July 12, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/online/ 
blogs/newsdesk/2010/07/doma.html.
 4.  See, e.g., infra notes 5, 10, and accompanying text. 
 5.  John D’Emilio, Will the Courts Set Us Free? Reflections on the Campaign for 
Same-Sex Marriage, in THE POLITICS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 39, 59 (Craig A. Rimmerman 
& Clyde Wilcox eds., 2007). 
 6.  GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL 
CHANGE? 416 (2d ed. 2008).  
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Department of Public Health7 provoked “thirteen states [to add] to 
their constitutions language defining marriage as a union between a 
man and a woman,”8 “mobilized conservative Christians to turn out 
at the polls,”9 and “clearly provided the margin of victory for Republi-
can senators in closely fought contests in states.”10
 These studies all rely on a particular historical account of past 
same-sex marriage decisions and their effect on political debate. Ac-
cording to this account, the primary effect of same-sex marriage 
litigation has been backlash—the mobilization of conservative oppo-
nents of the cause.11 Groups like the Family Research Council and 
Focus on the Family have been arguably successful in organizing 
efforts to elect opponents of same-sex marriage and in introducing 
state constitutional bans of it.12   
 However, the historical account underlying criticisms of same-sex 
marriage litigation is fundamentally incomplete. Leading studies 
have missed the ways in which lawyers and gay rights activists have 
responded to the decisions, often changing the rhetorical strategies 
and coalitions that define the debate. As we shall see, partly in 
response to Baker v. State,13 a Vermont opinion, and Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health,14 a Massachusetts decision, national 
gay rights groups like the Freedom to Marry Coalition and the Hu-
man Rights Campaign began stressing equality-based claims. Before 
the Baker decision, such national gay rights organizations encour-
aged members not to make equality- or civil-rights-based claims. 
Similarly, between the Supreme Court’s summer 2003 decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas15 that sodomy bans were unconstitutional and the 
issuance of Goodridge, privacy-based arguments have played at least 
as prominent a role in same-sex marriage advocacy as did the equality-
based arguments that now define public discussion. Responding to 
Baker and Goodridge, same-sex marriage organizations and their 
opponents appear to have shifted the balance of the argumentative 
strategies that they had used. Gay rights organizations began focus-
ing on claims that linked the same-sex marriage movement of the 
early 2000s to the civil rights movement of the 1960s.16 In turn, 
opponents of same-sex marriage, such as Focus on the Family, the 
 7.  798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 8.  Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV.
431, 466 (2005). 
 9.  Id. at 467. 
 10.  Id. at 468. 
 11.  See, e.g., supra notes 5, 10, and accompanying text. 
 12.  See supra notes 5, 8, and accompanying text.
 13.  744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 14.  798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 15.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 16.  See infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text. 
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Family Research Council, and the Traditional Values Coalition, less 
often justified discrimination against gays and lesbians, stressing 
instead the unique benefits of straight marriage or even the religious 
freedom of those who did not support same-sex marriage.17
 Advocates in the same-sex marriage debate also used Baker and 
Goodridge as leverage in efforts to reshape the coalitions on either 
side of the issue. The evolution of the debate in Massachusetts offers 
a persuasive example. Whereas before the decisions, in the late 
1990s, state gay rights organizations were able to form alliances only 
with labor organizations or libertarian groups, Goodridge forced 
minority and civil rights organizations to take a stand for the first 
time. After Goodridge, groups like the Gay & Lesbian Advocates & 
Defenders (GLAD) and the Massachusetts Gay and Lesbian Political 
Caucus (MGLPC) were able to win their first endorsements from civil 
rights leaders like Coretta Scott King and Julian Bond of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).18
 By understanding the way that cause lawyers and grassroots ac-
tivists used decisions like Baker and Goodridge to reshape the terms 
of the debate and the coalitions participating in it, we will see that 
the impact of same-sex marriage litigation may be both more pro-
found and more complex than some scholars suggest. At this point it 
is difficult to tell whether the changes studied here will benefit the 
same-sex marriage movement in the long term. However, without 
studying all the effects of same-sex marriage litigation, current con-
clusions about its value are premature and potentially seriously 
flawed. Litigation may prove to have been much more strategically 
advisable than some current scholarship suggests. At the very least, 
the litigation campaign should be judged not by an incomplete 
historical account but by an assessment of its full impact. Baker
and Goodridge did not simply increase opposition to same-sex mar-
riage. Both decisions also fundamentally changed the terms of and 
the players in the debate in a way that may advance the same-sex 
marriage cause. 
 My argument proceeds in three parts. First, by tracing demands 
for same-sex marriage made between 1970 and 1990, Part II de-
scribes the mounting criticism of litigation of cases like Perry and
Gill. Part III considers the role of the litigation of Baehr v. Lewin,19
the Hawaii Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage decision, in making 
same-sex marriage a nationally prominent issue and, in doing so, po-
tentially benefiting the same-sex marriage movement. I turn next to 
a brief examination of the organizational attitudes of major pro- and 
 17.  See infra notes 224-28, 240-47, and accompanying text. 
 18.  See infra notes 264-65, 270-72, and accompanying text. 
 19.  852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
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anti-gay-marriage organizations toward same-sex marriage in the 
years immediately before and after Baehr. Part IV studies how Baker 
and Goodridge helped to alter the argumentative strategies used by 
groups on either side of the issue. Looking closely at a case study 
involving the same-sex marriage debate in Massachusetts, Part V 
analyzes the way in which the changing terms of the marriage debate 
helped to reshape the coalitions involved in the struggle. Part VI 
briefly concludes.  
II. PERRY, GILL, AND THE LITIGATION QUESTION
 In the face of continuing skepticism, proponents of same-sex mar-
riage have continued to pursue litigation. Nonetheless, critics have 
pointed to several waves of backlash that have followed judicial deci-
sions favoring same-sex marriage. In 2004, following the recognition 
of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, a series of successful state 
constitutional bans was introduced.20 Some observers attribute the 
victories by Republican opponents of same-sex marriage in the 2004 
elections to the backlash against the Goodridge opinion.21 From 2008 
to 2009, anger about the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re 
Marriage Cases22 created intense opposition, culminating in the pas-
sage of Proposition Eight, a state constitutional amendment over-
turning the decision.23
 In the academy, these events inspired a number of attacks on the 
use of litigation by the same-sex marriage movement. Gerald Rosen-
berg has written extensively on the courts’ inability to create political 
change, be it in the context of same-sex marriage or otherwise.24 Re-
cently, in writing about the same-sex marriage struggle, Rosenberg 
suggested that the use of litigation has been entirely counterproductive 
for the movement.25 As he succinctly writes, “Litigation as a means of 
obtaining the right to same-sex marriage has not succeeded.”26
 20.  For a discussion of the state constitutional amendments passed before 2006, see
ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 357, 361-64. 
 21.  See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 8, at 466-68. 
 22.  183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 23.  For coverage of the impact of Proposition Eight and the controversy it generated, 
see Janet Kornblum, Post-Prop 8, Thousands Join Protest: Gay-Marriage Ban in California 
Stirs Torchbearers, USA TODAY, Nov. 14, 2008, at 3A. 
 24.  See, e.g., Gerald N. Rosenberg, Courting Disaster: Looking for Change in All the 
Wrong Places, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 795, 796-97 (2006) (arguing that courts traditionally 
defend status quo and privilege instead of promoting social change); Gerald N. Rosenberg, 
The Irrelevant Court: The Supreme Court’s Inability to Influence Popular Beliefs about 
Equality (or Anything Else), in REDEFINING EQUALITY 172 (Neal Devins & Davison M. 
Douglas eds., 1998) (arguing that the Court’s decisions do not affect popular opinion about 
racial or gender equality). 
 25.  See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 339-421. 
 26.  Id. at 415. 
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 Michael Klarman, who has written extensively on the backlash 
produced by controversial judicial decisions, has also suggested that 
victories achieved through litigation have set back the same-sex mar-
riage movement.27 He has focused on the popular defiance produced 
by the Goodridge decision, arguing that the litigation of the case 
increased opposition to same-sex marriage.28 He emphasized the 
ways in which Goodridge created backlash: by increasing public at-
tention to the same-sex marriage issue and by attempting to settle 
the issue before public support for same-sex marriage had solidified.29
Historians of sexuality and sexual orientation, like John D’Emilio, 
have been equally critical.30
 Skepticism about the value of litigation for same-sex marriage has 
intensified recently because of the prominence of two related cases. 
Perhaps the best known case, Perry v. Schwarzenegger,31 involved a 
federal constitutional challenge to Proposition Eight.32 Perry attracted 
attention for several reasons. First, those challenging Proposition 
Eight, Theodore Olson and David Boies, often had found themselves 
on opposing sides of the political spectrum in the past and, in fact, 
argued against one another in Bush v. Gore.33 Second, at the trial 
court level, Perry dramatically held that Proposition Eight violated 
both the federal Due Process Clause and Equal Protection 
Clause.34 Third, as a federal challenge, Perry also may well reach the 
Supreme Court.35
 Concerns about backlash have featured prominently in discussion 
regarding Perry. As William Eskridge and Darren Spedale have 
shown, attorneys defending Proposition Eight have argued in court 
that the popular backlash likely to follow a same-sex marriage victo-
ry in Perry would “undermine the legitimacy of the federal courts.”36
Commentators generally sympathetic to the same-sex marriage cause 
 27.  See Klarman, supra note 8, at 459-73.  
 28.  See id.
 29.  See id.
 30.  See generally D’Emilio, supra note 5. 
 31.  704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 32.  Lambda Legal offers access to the briefs and other filings in Perry. See Lambda 
Legal, Perry v. Brown (Formerly Known as Perry v. Schwarzenegger),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/perry-v-schwarzenegger.html (last visited Apr. 
25, 2012). 
 33.  See Jesse McKinley, Bush v. Gore Foes Join to Fight California Gay Marriage 
Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A1; Jesse McKinley, Fight to Reverse California’s Same-
Sex Marriage Ban Heads to Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2010, at A9. For examples of 
coverage of the lower court’s decision in Perry, see supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 34.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  
 35.  For predictions to this effect, see, for example, Devin Dwyer, Unconstitutional: 
Federal Court Overturns Proposition 8, Gay Marriage Ban in California, ABC NEWS (Aug. 
4, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/california-gay-marriage-ruling-due-appeal-expected/ 
story?id=11322255#.T3G_-mEgeEY.  
 36.  See Eskridge & Spedale, supra note 1.  
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have been equally vocal in questioning the wisdom of those pursuing 
the Perry litigation. In a joint memo signed by nine organizations, 
including Lambda Legal, the Human Rights Campaign, and the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), advocates sympathetic to 
the cause predicted that popular backlash might lead to defeat in the 
Supreme Court.37 As the joint memo explained, “There is a very sig-
nificant chance that if we go to the Supreme Court and lose, the 
Court will say that discrimination against LGBT people is fairly easy 
to justify.”38 At the same time, Jennifer Pizer, the Lambda attorney 
who argued Perry at the state level, stressed the unique dangers of 
backlash tied to federal litigation.39
 Similar concerns about backlash have surrounded the decision to 
litigate Gill.40 Brought by Mary Bonauto and GLAD, Gill and its 
companion case, Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Department of 
Health and Human Services,41 present several challenges to Section 
three of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which denied a host of 
federal benefits to married same-sex couples.42 In July 2010, Judge 
Joseph Tauro of the Massachusetts District Court ruled in GLAD’s 
favor, holding that Section three violated the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment and, in Department of Health and Human 
Services, that it also violated the Tenth Amendment provisions on 
state authority.43 Even some supportive of the same-sex marriage 
cause have suggested that Gill will do the movement more harm 
than good. For example, Jack Balkin has argued that if the Supreme 
Court upholds the ruling in Gill on appeal or even denies certiorari—
in effect, permitting the same result—the Court would “spark an 
equally big political backlash.”44
 Many of the criticisms of the litigation strategy like the ones pur-
sued in Perry and Gill rely on a particular historical narrative about 
the impact of past same-sex marriage decisions. According to this 
narrative, litigation primarily has undermined the same-sex mar-
riage cause.45 Victories in cases like Baehr v. Lewin, Baker, and 
 37.  See Arana, supra note 3. 
 38.  Id.
 39.  Id.
 40.  699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 41.  For the initial memorandum filed in this case, see Memorandum, Massachusetts 
v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010).  
 42.  Massachusetts v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 235-36 
(D. Mass. 2010). 
 43.  Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 377 (D. Mass. 2010); Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d at 236. 
 44.  Jack M. Balkin, How Things Might Turn Out Well in the DOMA Cases,
BALKINIZATION (July 13, 2010, 1:50 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/07/how-things-
might-turn-out-well-in-doma.html.  
 45.  See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 415-16. 
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Goodridge increased opposition to same-sex marriage.46 Socially con-
servative groups like the Family Research Council and Focus on the 
Family mobilized to oppose the decisions.47 Partly because of these 
activists, a wave of measures opposing same-sex marriage appeared, 
including state constitutional bans.48 Relying on this history, critics 
in the same-sex marriage movement and the academy caution 
against the use of litigation both in cases like Perry and Gill and in 
the future. 
 However, the historical account on which these critics rely is in-
complete. As we shall see, decisions like Baker and Goodridge not 
only produced backlash but also influenced the terms of the debate 
about same-sex marriage and the coalitions participating in it in a 
way that may have advanced the same-sex marriage cause. It is diffi-
cult to establish whether these shifts will necessarily benefit the 
same-sex marriage movement in the long term; however, the history 
considered here will show that the past effects of same-sex marriage 
litigation have been more complex and less well understood than 
many current studies suggest. Criticisms of the decision to litigate 
cases like Perry and Gill are at best premature. Past decisions like 
Baker and Goodridge should be judged by their true impact, not by 
an incomplete and unduly negative historical narrative. With a bet-
ter understanding of the past, we may see that the litigation of cases 
like Baker and Goodridge—and current cases like Perry and Gill—
were more beneficial for the same-sex marriage movement than we 
may now realize.  
III.   THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE QUESTION: 1970-1993 
 As George Chauncey has convincingly shown, the first legal de-
mands for same-sex marriage long predated the litigation of Baehr v. 
Lewin in the early 1990s.49 For example, in the 1970s, same-sex cou-
ples in Minnesota and Los Angeles brought constitutional test cases 
that received national press attention.50 Nonetheless, as we shall see, 
same-sex marriage was mostly a marginal issue for the mainstream 
gay rights movement before the 1993 Baehr decision. In this regard, 
Baehr may have benefitted the same-sex marriage cause by dramati-
cally increasing awareness of the issue, both in the gay rights move-
ment and in the broader society. 
 46.  See, e.g., D’Emilio, supra note 5, at 59-61. 
 47.  See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 8, at 459-60, 466-68. 
 48.  See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 356-64. 
 49.  GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY’S DEBATE
OVER GAY EQUALITY 78, 89-92 (2004). 
 50.  See Court Won’t Let Men Wed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1971, at 65; Myrna Oliver, Gay 
Couple Can’t Wed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1977, at D6.  
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A.   Before Baehr: 1970-1993 
 When same-sex marriage first emerged as an issue, it was not tied 
to major gay liberation organizations but instead to the Metropolitan 
Community Church, founded in 1969 in Los Angeles by the Reverend 
Troy Perry.51 The church’s stated mission involved the provision of 
spiritual sanctuary and guidance to openly gay men and women 
who had been turned away from mainstream churches.52 Originally, 
when Reverend Perry celebrated twenty-eight commitment ceremo-
nies in 1970, church leaders described the ceremonies in religious, 
rather than political, terms.53 In February of 1970, Reverend Perry 
explained that gay couples had spiritual reasons for seeking mar-
riage and “settling down like anyone else.”54 The term often used to 
describe the relationship celebrated by the Church, “holy unions,” 
also made apparent the religious dimension of the Church’s ceremo-
nies.55 By the summer of 1970, however, some couples, including 
those involved with the Church, began seeking legal recognition of 
their relationships.56
 Between 1970 and 1971, a number of prominent test cases drew 
on the church’s efforts to legalize same-sex unions but did so in ex-
clusively secular and legal terms. The most famous test case, Baker 
v. Nelson,57 brought by University of Minnesota students Richard 
Baker and James McConnell, had no link to the church’s religious 
rhetoric. Baker and McConnell focused instead on rights to privacy, 
freedom of association, and freedom from cruel and unusual punish-
ment involved in barring access to marriage.58
 Like Baker and McConnell’s ultimately unsuccessful litigation, 
many of the early test cases were brought without contact with the 
church and without major organizational support. For example, when 
a Boulder, Colorado, county clerk performed six gay weddings in 
1975, the New York Times reported no link to the church or to any 
other major group.59 It was only in the spring of 1977 that test cases 
 51.  See Edward B. Fiske, Homosexuals in Los Angeles, Like Many Elsewhere, Want 
Religion and Establish Their Own Church, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1970, at 58. 
 52.  See A Church for Homosexuals, CHI. TRIB., June 7, 1970, at G84. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  See Fiske, supra note 51.
 55.  See Nancy Nappo, A Church for Homosexuals: Princeton Congregation Rents Space 
in Unitarian Church, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1977, at NJ3 (offering an example of the use of 
the term “holy union” by members of the Metropolitan Community Church); see also Ellen 
Lewin, Commitment Ceremonies, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND RELIGION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 99,
100 (Jeffrey S. Siker ed., 2007) (same).  
 56.  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR 
WORSE? WHAT WE’VE LEARNED FROM THE EVIDENCE 16 (2006). 
 57.  191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
 58.  For a summary of Baker and McConnell’s arguments, see id.
 59.  Grace Lichtenstein, Homosexual Weddings Stir Controversy in Colorado, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1975, at 49. 
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drew on the religious rhetoric used by the church. In March of that 
year, for example, Reverend Mikhail Itkin—the prior of the Commu-
nity of the Love of Christ, a similar organization—brought a test case 
on behalf of himself and his partner that invoked, among other 
things, the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.60
 For the most part, however, even test cases like Itkin’s disap-
peared from the gay rights legal reform agenda between 1978 and 
1990. There were several reasons for this development. First and 
most obviously, the test cases brought between 1970 and 1977 had 
been uniformly unsuccessful and offered little encouragement to ac-
tivists interested in legalizing gay marriage. The relative success of 
Baker v. Nelson,61 the case that advanced the furthest in the courts, 
is illustrative of the generally dismal results that activists encoun-
tered: the Minnesota Supreme Court did not reject Baker and 
McConnell’s privacy and sex discrimination claims out of hand, but 
rather analyzed their arguments before ultimately rejecting them.62
 As importantly, inspired by the Stonewall Riot of 1969, major rad-
ical gay rights organizations like the Gay Liberation Front and the 
Gay Activists’ Alliance viewed marriage reform as unimportant, if 
not dangerously conformist. For example, the Gay Liberation Front 
protested not only in favor of homosexual rights but also against the 
institution of marriage.63 As Michael Brown, a member of the Gay 
Liberation Front, explained to the New York Times in August 1970, 
“We’re not oriented toward acceptance but toward changing every 
institution in the country—male domination, capitalist exploitation, 
all the rest of it.”64
 Moreover, between 1975 and 1979, as part of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) campaign, women’s organizations that might 
have been sympathetic to demands for same-sex marriage began to 
distance themselves from the issue. By July 1975, discussion of same-
sex marriage had become a central tactic of Phyllis Schlafly’s 
S.T.O.P. E.R.A. and other major organizations opposed to the 
Amendment. As Schlafly wrote in a July 1975 edition of The Phyllis 
Schlafly Report, the “ERA [would] legalize homosexual marriages 
and give homosexuals and lesbians all the rights of husbands and 
wives such as the right to file joint income tax returns, to adopt chil-
dren, to teach in the schools, etc.”65 Between 1974 and 1976, the ho-
 60.  See Oliver, supra note 50. 
 61.  191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
 62.  See id.
 63.  See, e.g., DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE 
STRUGGLE TO BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 38 (1999).  
 64.  Steven V. Roberts, Homosexuals in Revolt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1970, at 28. 
 65.  Phyllis Schlafly, The Hypocrisy of ERA Proponents, THE PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY 
REPORT (The Eagle Trust Fund, Alton, Ill.), July 1975, at 3, in The Phyllis Schlafly Report 
Collection (on file with Harvard University).  
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mosexual marriage argument against the ERA continued to play a 
central role in state-level campaigns like the one against the State 
Equal Rights Amendment in New York and another against the rati-
fication of the federal ERA in Georgia.66
 During the 1975 campaign in New York, even ERA proponents 
began distancing themselves from homosexual-rights claims. Sandra 
Turner, the executive director of the New York Equal Rights Coali-
tion, said of opposition arguments, “None of the scare tactic things 
they say will happen—such as legalizing homosexual marriages.”67
By 1977, after President Carter announced and funded a national 
conference in honor of International Women’s Year (IWY), feminist 
members of the Oversight Committee for IWY supported “lesbian 
rights” in the abstract but clearly stated that the ERA would not 
“require [s]tates to permit homosexual marriages.”68
 During the period between 1977 and 1990, gay rights activists 
also saw little reason to make same-sex marriage a great priority. 
One reason for the movement’s inattention to the issue was the out-
break of the AIDS epidemic, which made marriage seem of marginal 
importance. By 1987, organizations like the National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force (NGLTF) and the Human Rights Campaign reported to 
the New York Times that AIDS had “increased the level of gay partic-
ipation in American politics by a tremendous amount.”69
 However, as the New York Times reported, “energy and resources 
of gay groups [were] diverted from basic rights issues,” such as those 
for marriage, sodomy ban repeals, or the introduction of antidiscrim-
ination ordinances, as more time was devoted “toward efforts for 
more funds for AIDS treatment and research and to protect infected 
people from discrimination.”70 At the same time, between 1985 and 
1987, in states like New York and California, the publicity surrounding 
the AIDS crisis prompted an anti-gay backlash, even against reforms 
considered to be more mainstream than same-sex marriage, includ-
ing the repeal of sodomy bans, as opponents of gay rights cited public 
 66.  See Robin Morris, Organizing Breadmakers: Kathryn Dunaway’s ERA Battle and 
the Roots of Georgia’s Republican Revolution, in ENTERING THE FRAY: GENDER, POLITICS,
AND CULTURE IN THE NEW SOUTH 161, 161-64 (Jonathan Daniel Wells & Sheila R. Phipps 
eds., 2010); Judy Klemesrud, As New York Vote on Equal Rights Nears, Two Sides Speak 
Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1975, at 46. 
 67.  See Klemesrud, supra note 66. 
 68.  National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year, The 
Spirit of Houston: The First National Women’s Conference, An Official Report to the 
President, The Congress and the People of the United States 51 (1978). See also Megan 
Rosenfeld & Bill Curry, Women’s Conference Passes Abortion, Gay Rights Measures, WASH.
POST, Nov. 21, 1977, at A1.  
 69.  Thomas Morgan, Amid AIDS, Gay Movement Grows but Shifts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
10, 1987, at 1. 
 70.  Id.
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health as well as religious reasons for criminalizing gay sex.71 As 
George Chauncey argued, the AIDS crisis helped to highlight legal 
needs in the gay and lesbian community that could be met through 
legalized marriage, especially those involving intestacy rules, adop-
tion, survivors’ benefits, and Social Security.72 In the 1980s, however, 
the AIDS struggle made a campaign for same-sex marriage seem less 
urgent and less politically feasible. 
 The Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick73 also 
helped to make marriage a less central priority in the gay rights legal 
reform agenda. Bowers rejected a constitutional challenge to a Geor-
gia law criminalizing homosexual sodomy.74 The decision reoriented 
the reform agenda of major gay rights organizations in several ways. 
First, the decision focused new attention on the need to repeal crimi-
nal sodomy bans. The NGLTF founded the Privacy Project, an initia-
tive focused on campaigning against Bowers and the sodomy bans 
that remained on the books in twenty-five states and the District of 
Columbia.75 In speaking out against Bowers, members of groups like 
the NGLTF also emphasized the link between sodomy bans and the 
denial of other rights to which gays or lesbians should be entitled.76
 In the aftermath of Bowers, groups like the NGLTF and Lambda 
Legal pursued a two-pronged strategy: challenging sodomy bans 
while also pursuing municipal or statewide laws prohibiting discrim-
ination in employment, housing, or public accommodations. Organizers 
like Nan Hunter of the ACLU embraced this approach, and Sue Hyde 
of the NGLTF explained, “[I]t [was] not wise to have sodomy law 
repeal as the first goal [for a statewide group]. . . . [L]ocal or 
statewide civil rights protection laws and hate crimes legislation 
[were] easier to fight for.”77 Hyde’s prediction proved to be correct: 
whereas only Wisconsin and the District of Columbia prohibited sex-
ual orientation discrimination when Bowers was decided, several 
other states had done so by 1993, including Massachusetts, Connecti-
cut, New Jersey, Vermont, and Rhode Island.78 In the struggle for 
 71.  See id.; Clare Ansberry, Fear and Loathing: AIDS, Stirring Panic and Prejudice, 
Tests the Nation’s Character, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1987, at 1. 
 72.  See CHAUNCEY, supra note 49, at 96-111. 
      73.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 74.  Id. at 190-96.  
 75.  See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Sodomy Ruling’s Implications Extend Far Beyond 
Bedroom, WASH. POST, July 2, 1986, at A1; Jay Mathews, Antisodomy Laws Targeted for 
Repeal After High Court Ruling, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1987, at A16; Jennie McKnight, 
Keeping Sodomy on the (Political) Agenda, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, July 16-22, 1989, at 16. 
 76.  See McKnight, supra note 75. 
 77.  Id. For an overview of the campaign against criminal sodomy bans, see generally 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA 1861-
2003 (2008). 
 78.  National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, State Non-Discrimination Laws in the 
U.S. (Jan. 20, 2012), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue_maps/ 
non_discrimination_1_12.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). 
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sodomy repeal and antidiscrimination legislation, marriage seemed 
to be a secondary priority. 
B.   Baehr: The Birth of a National Issue 
 As a whole, national gay rights organizations continued to deem-
phasize same-sex marriage as a legal reform goal between 1990 and 
1994. For example, when Ninia Baehr and Genora Dancel, Joseph 
Melillo and Patrick Lagon, and Tammy Rodrigues and Antoinette 
Pregil challenged the decision to deny them marriage licenses in the 
early stages of the Baehr litigation, the ACLU and the Lambda Legal 
Defense and Education Fund turned away the couples’ requests for 
assistance.79 ACLU attorneys later cited “serious strategic questions,” 
including a fear of backlash, as justification for the organization’s 
refusal to take the case.80
 Baehr helped to increase the prominence of the same-sex marriage 
issue within national gay rights organizations and in state and 
national debates. However, backlash accompanying the rising prom-
inence of the same-sex marriage issue is well known. In 1996, partly 
because of fear that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would require 
other states to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated in Hawaii, 
Congress passed a federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), and sev-
eral states passed similar measures.81 Nonetheless, Baehr also helped 
to make same-sex marriage an organizational priority for both gay 
rights groups and their opponents. 
 Indeed, in July 1995, a coalition of prominent national gay rights 
groups, calling themselves the Freedom to Marry Coalition, were 
willing to endorse the cause publicly and met in order to discuss how 
best to frame the issue.82
 Similarly, Human Rights Campaign leaders first spoke out about 
same-sex marriage in the spring of 1996, after the Defense of Mar-
riage Act was introduced in response to Baehr. However, while working 
to prevent then-President Clinton from supporting DOMA, the 
Human Rights Campaign did not argue that same-sex marriage was 
 79.  Paul M. Barrett, I Do/No You Don’t: How Hawaii Became Ground Zero in Battle 
Over Gay Marriages, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1996, at A1.  
 80.  Id.
 81.  As enacted in 1996, section two of DOMA explicitly addressed the full-faith-and-
credit argument. Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. Res. 3396, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted).  
 82.  See, e.g., Freedom to Marry Coalition Meeting Agenda and Notes (July 24, 1995), 
in The Human Sexuality Archive, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file with 
Cornell University); Letter from Evan Wolfson to Rob Banaszak (July 20, 1995), in The 
Human Sexuality Archive, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file with 
Cornell University). 
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constitutionally necessary or socially desirable.83 At first, leaders of 
the organization spoke only about the motivations and sincerity of 
those sponsoring DOMA.84 In May 1996, for example, Human Rights 
Campaign member Daniel Zingale told the San Francisco Chronicle 
that DOMA supporters had a “clear political motive” since no state 
had seriously considered permitting same-sex couples to marry.85
Nonetheless, whether Campaign members spoke about same-sex 
marriage as an issue of “gratuitous gay-bashing” or otherwise, Baehr 
made the issue of same-sex marriage a more prominent one for 
the organization.86
 Baehr also helped to make same-sex marriage a more significant 
issue for evangelical and New Right organizations. Before the Baehr
decision and to take advantage of the election of a conservative, “fam-
ily values” majority in Congress, evangelical organizations like Focus 
on the Family, the Family Research Council, and the Traditional 
Values Coalition focused not on same-sex marriage but on the pas-
sage of a “Religious Equality Amendment” to the Federal Constitution, 
a measure that would legalize school prayer and overrule Supreme 
Court decisions to the contrary.87 After Baehr, New Right groups 
committed significant resources and time to the passage of a Federal 
Defense of Marriage Act. By November 1999, Reverend James Dob-
son of Focus on the Family described same-sex marriage as the 
greatest threat to family values.88
 Baehr succeeded in drawing public attention and organizational 
interest to the issue of same-sex marriage and, in doing so, poten-
tially benefitted the same-sex marriage movement. However, as 
we shall see, the effects of two later same-sex marriage decisions, 
Baker and Goodridge, were more complex. These decisions helped to 
reshape the argumentative strategies of major organizations on 
either side of the debate.  
 83.  See, e.g., Joseph Hanania, The Debate Over Gay Marriages: No Unity, L.A. TIMES,
June 13, 1996, at E1; Laura Meckler, Clinton Says He’d Sign Ban on Gay Marriages,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 23, 1996, at A13.
 84.  Carolyn Lochhead, GOP Bill Targets Same-Sex Marriages: Measure Would Affect 
Benefits, Recogniton, S.F. CHRON., May 9, 1996, at A1 (reporting early Human Rights 
Campaign commentary on same-sex marriage).  
 85.  Id.
 86.  See, e.g., Barbara Vobejda, Same-Sex Marriage Becomes Political Issue: Gay-
Rights Advocates Protest White House Backing of Federal Ban, WASH. POST, May 23, 1996, 
at A14. 
 87.  See Gustav Niebuhr, The Religious Right Readies Agenda for Second 100 Days,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1995, at A1. As Reverend Louis Sheldon of the Traditional Values 
Coalition explained, many evangelicals’ “main thrust [was] going to be the Religious 
Equality Amendment.” Id.
 88.  See Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison of Mixed-Race 
and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 255, 264 (2002) (quoting Dobson) 
(“If same sex marriage becomes lawful . . . marriage will be finished.”).  
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IV.   THE TERMS OF THE DISCUSSION
 The major argumentative strategies used by national organiza-
tions on either side of the same-sex marriage battle looked very dif-
ferent in 2004 than they did in 1999.89 Citing recent decisions by the 
Vermont Supreme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court, proponents downplayed privacy-based claims or arguments 
featuring the traditional importance of marriage, instead empha-
sizing arguments about the rights of gay and lesbian couples to 
equal treatment. For their part, after the decision of Goodridge in 
2003, same-sex marriage opponents like the Family Research Coun-
cil began deemphasizing arguments that homosexuality should never 
be socially acceptable and would necessarily undermine straight 
marriage. Instead, these organizations echoed Goodridge’s empha-
sis on civil rights and equal treatment as support for their own 
claims of religious liberty. Opposition to same-sex marriage was 
reframed as an exercise of the very civil rights of which the 
Goodridge Court spoke.  
 At least at this point in the same-sex marriage struggle, it is im-
possible to assess which side will benefit in the long term from the 
changes in argumentative strategies studied here. At the same time, 
however, scholars portraying the history of same-sex marriage litiga-
tion in purely negative terms have done so prematurely and poten-
tially incorrectly. These decisions proved to be powerful tools for 
same-sex marriage advocates working to reshape the terms of discus-
sion and the alliances that shaped it. By missing the effects of these 
judicial decisions on the terms of the same-sex marriage debate, 
scholars have looked at only part of the story. With a fuller under-
standing of the past, we may see that the litigation of cases like 
Baker and Goodridge, or even Perry and Gill, was more beneficial 
than some leading analyses suggest. 
 89.  It is worth noting that, in the early stages of the struggle for same-sex marriage, 
grassroots and regional organizations led the campaigns in Hawaii and Vermont. 
Significantly, in the lead-up to Baker, Beth Robinson and Susan Murray of the Vermont 
Freedom to Marry Coalition, a grassroots lobbying and litigation unit, and Mary Bonauto 
of GLAD, a regional litigation group, championed equality-based arguments that had been 
rejected by national gay rights groups. At a press conference in November 1998, Bonauto 
explained that Baker was “about what . . . Vermont’s guarantees of equality mean for 
Vermont citizens.” See Mary Ziegler, Framing Change: Cause Lawyering, Constitutional 
Decisions, and Social Change, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 263, 300 (2010) (quoting Gay Marriage 
Debate Set in Vermont Court, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 18, 1998, at A5). At a Vermont 
Freedom to Marry rally the following February, Deborah Lashman, a prominent member of 
Vermont Freedom to Marry, reaffirmed this rhetorical strategy, explaining that the issue 
was whether the Vermont Constitution allowed “the Legislature to single out a class of 
families for adverse treatment.” Press Release, Vermont Freedom to Marry Task Force, 
Civil Rights Group Denounces Discriminatory Bill (Feb. 1999) (on file with the author). 
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A.   The Freedom to Marry Coalition 
 In the mid-1990s, the Freedom to Marry Coalition members, 
which are now known as Marriage Equality U.S.A. and Freedom to 
Marry, grew out of informal meetings on marriage strategy called by 
Lambda Legal and joined by several other gay rights organizations.90
By July 1995, the organizations formally called themselves the Free-
dom to Marry Coalition and set out to develop a coherent rhetorical 
strategy.91 Coalition members first considered whether to use equal 
protection arguments like those advanced in the campaign against 
“anti-special-treatment” laws, measures prohibiting antidiscrimina-
tion protections for gays and lesbians.92 After California Governor 
Pete Wilson vetoed an anti-sexual-orientation discrimination bill in 
1991,93 a number of states began introducing “anti-special-treatment” 
legislation, including Colorado’s Amendment 2, which would ulti-
mately be challenged in 1996 in Romer v. Evans.94
 The Coalition’s polling data indicated that a majority of Ameri-
cans believed that same-sex marriage was “not a civil rights issue.”95
Instead of connecting the same-sex marriage movement to the 
movement for civil rights, Coalition members were asked to describe 
marriage as a “[b]asic human right,” something that same-sex cou-
ples “already ha[d]” that was “being taken away.”96 In 1996, the Human 
Rights Campaign issued “talking points” for debaters that reflected 
this emphasis.97 In focusing on similar concerns, the Coalition created 
a Marriage Resolution, stating that “[b]ecause marriage is a basic 
 90.  See supra note 82 and accompanying text. For a sample of the early press state-
ments made by members of the Freedom to Marry Coalition, see, for example, Frank J. 
Murray, Lambda Project Presses Issue, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, at A4; Nora Villagran, 
State of Matrimony Refusing to Alter Plans of Commitment, Same-Gender Couples Wed 
While Awaiting the Day Such Unions Get a Legal Blessing, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 
6, 1995, at 1H. On the current operations of Freedom to Marry, see, for example, About 
Freedom to Marry, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/about-us 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2012). On the current operations of Marriage Equality U.S.A., see, for 
example, About MEUSA, MARRIAGE EQUALITY, http://www.marriageequality.org/about-
meusa (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). 
 91.  See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 92.  For discussion of other examples of other anti-special treatment laws, see Padula 
v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) and Equal. Found. of Greater Cinncinnati, 
Inc. v. City of Cinncinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995).  
 93.  Leef Smith, Gay Rights Demonstrators Decry California Veto; 4,000 Rally at State 
Capitol Governor Says Existing Laws Protect Against Discrimination, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 
1991, at A13. 
 94.  Timothy Egan, Anti-Gay Backlashes Are on 3 States’ Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
1992, at 4; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (striking down Colorado’s 
Amendment 2 on equal-protection grounds). 
 95.  See Freedom to Marry Coalition Meeting Agenda and Notes, supra note 82. 
 96.  See id.
 97.  Human Rights Campaign, Talking Points (Jan. 31, 1996), in The National Gay 
and Lesbian Task Force Collection Papers, Human Sexuality Archive, Division of Rare and 
Manuscript Collections (on file with Cornell University). 
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human right and an individual personal choice, . . . the State should 
not interfere with same-gender couples who choose to marry.”98
 The Coalition’s insistence on rights-based arguments affected 
which alliances the organization pursued. This was apparent when 
Coalition leaders called another meeting in October 1995 to discuss 
with which organizations or individual leaders the Coalition could 
form alliances.99 Coalition leaders named a number of possible con-
stituencies to whom rights-based arguments might appeal, including 
“unions, women’s groups, people of color groups, religious groups,” 
progressive civil rights groups, celebrities, and corporations “with 
non-discrimination policies.”100
 After Republican Senators first presented the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act in May 1996,101 the Coalition continued relying primari-
ly on rights-based arguments in campaigning for same-sex marriage. 
For example, Parents, Families, and Friends of Lesbians and Gays 
(PFLAG), one of the organizations belonging to the Coalition, sent 
out an alert about the Defense of Marriage Act, arguing that 
“[m]arriage [was] a basic human right” and that “[t]he decision of 
whom to marry [was] a deeply personal one that should not be inter-
fered with [by] the federal government.”102
 Between 1997 and the winter of 1999, the Coalition continued re-
lying primarily on rights-based arguments in campaigning for same-
sex marriage. These efforts still centered on the Marriage Resolution, 
as did the Coalition’s strategy of building alliances with religious or-
ganizations or civil rights groups willing to sign it.103 When the Coali-
tion did make equality-based legal arguments, those claims did not 
directly involve sexual orientation. On National Freedom to Marry 
Day in 1998, for example, Evan Wolfson, one of the Coalition leaders, 
did not stress equality-based claims but reiterated that “[t]he choice 
 98.  See Freedom to Marry Coalition Meeting Agenda and Notes, supra note 82. For 
the full text of the Marriage Resolution, see Lambda Urges Religious Leaders to Support 
Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples, LAMBDA LEGAL (Aug. 13, 1998), 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/ny_19980813_lambda-urges-religious-leaders-to-support-
marriage-equality. 
 99.  See Memorandum from Evan Wolfson to the Steering Comm. of the Nat’l Freedom 
to Marry Coal. (Oct.16, 1995), in The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Collection, The 
Human Sexuality Archive, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file with 
Cornell University). 
 100.  See id.
 101.  See Cassandra Burrell, GOP Bill Would Bar Same-Sex Marriages, HOUS. CHRON., 
May 8, 1996, at A9.  
 102.  PFLAG Public Education Committee, DOMA Action Alert (May 10, 1996), in The 
PFLAG Papers, The Human Sexuality Archive, Division of Rare and Manuscript 
Collections (on file with Cornell University).  
 103.  See Lambda Urges Religious Leaders to Support Marriage Equality for Same-Sex 
Couples, supra note 98. 
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of whether and whom to marry [was] one of the most important per-
sonal decisions there is.”104
 In litigating Baker, GLAD, a key member of the Coalition, also 
stressed that marriage was a “fundamental right” tied to the “pro-
found mutual love, respect, commitment, and intimacy . . . essential 
for human dignity.”105 The Baker reply brief focused on the ways in 
which marriage was a fundamental right, emphasizing its expressive 
functions and the social status it enjoyed.106 To the extent that GLAD 
touched on equality interests, the brief argued only that existing 
marriage laws involved constitutionally impermissible “sex-based 
classifications,” premised on gender stereotypes.107 The brief did not 
explicitly address discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
nor did it discuss at length the effects of existing marriage laws on 
same-sex couples.108
 The Baker decision in the winter of 1999 created a valuable oppor-
tunity for those in the organization seeking to emphasize different 
arguments. After rejecting a claim that Vermont’s existing marriage 
statute provided for gay marriage, the Baker majority surveyed 
Vermont precedent on the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont 
Constitution, an analysis not directly tied to the suspect-class juris-
prudence decided under the federal Equal Protection Clause.109 Rely-
ing on the text and history of the Common Benefits Clause, and 
without specifying a remedy, the majority held that same-sex couples 
were “entitled under Chapter I, Article 7, of the Vermont Constitu-
tion to obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont 
law to married opposite-sex couples.”110
 Of course, Baker touched on rights- as well as equality-based ar-
guments. The decision discussed the cultural significance of marriage 
and stressed its “public benefits and protections.”111 But the decision 
emphasized equal protection doctrine and equality-based rhetoric.  
 In doing so, Baker became an important new tool for the Coalition, 
legitimating and highlighting equality-based arguments explicitly 
linked to the decision itself. In early press releases following the deci-
sion, for example, Lambda leaders made no mention of the Marriage 
 104.  Press Release, Lambda Legal, National Freedom to Marry Day -- February 12 
(Jan. 12, 1998), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/ny_19980112_national-
freedom-to-marry-day. 
 105.  See Reply Brief for Appellants at 5, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (No. 
98-32), in The Human Rights Campaign Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript 
Collections (on file with Cornell University).  
 106.  Id. at 1, 4-5, 12. 
 107.  Id. at 13. 
 108.  See id.
 109. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 869-73 (Vt. 1999). 
 110.  Id. at 886. 
 111.  Id. at 883. 
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Resolution,112 instead quoting extensively from the Baker opinion and 
labeling it as a sign that “Americans are recognizing that it is time to 
end this discrimination” against same-sex couples.113 When the 
Coalition held another National Freedom to Marry Day in February 
of 2000, the event also highlighted Baker and its equal protection ar-
guments for same-sex marriage.114 Lambda members explained to the 
press that the message sent by Baker was that “gay couples and our 
families need the same protections and opportunities as non-gay cou-
ples.”115 Matthew Roberts, a regional director of Lambda, similarly 
argued that the decision sent a “resounding message of equality.”116
 Even after Vermont passed a civil union law rather than allowing 
same-sex marriage,117 Coalition members emphasized equal protec-
tion arguments drawn from Baker in advocating same-sex marriage. 
During the 2001 celebration of National Freedom to Marry Day, 
Ruth Harlow of Lambda borrowed the language of the Baker major-
ity in arguing that the celebration signified “a desire for all couples 
to be treated equally by law—nothing more, and nothing less.”118 In 
the same year, Evan Wolfson of the Coalition similarly explained 
that, in Baker, the gay rights movement had “show[n] that there 
[was] no good reason for sex discrimination in civil marriage, just as 
there was no good reason for race discrimination in civil marriage a 
generation ago.”119
 During the lead-up to oral argument in Lawrence v. Texas120 in the 
spring of 2003, however, there was some disagreement within the 
Coalition as to how best to present the petitioners’ case before the 
Supreme Court. Lawrence involved a constitutional challenge to a 
 112.  It is worth noting that a similar (although differently worded) Marriage Pledge is 
still used as an advocacy tool by Freedom to Marry. See Take the Pledge, FREEDOM TO 
MARRY, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/page/s/pledge (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). For the 
original language of the resolution, see Voice for Equality: Bea Arthur, FREEDOM TO MARRY
(Jan. 06, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/blog/entry/voice-for-equality-
bea-arthur. 
 113.  See, e.g., Press Release, Lambda Legal, In Dramatic First, Vermont High Court 
Orders State to Treat Gay & Non-Gay Couples Equally (Dec. 20, 1999),  
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/ny_19991220_dramatic-first-vt-high-court-orders-state-
treat-gay-nongay-couples-equally. 
 114.  See Press Release, Lambda Legal, Third Annual Freedom to Marry Day in Cities 
Nationwide (Feb. 8, 2000), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/ny_20000208_third-annual-
natl-freedom-to-marry-day. 
 115.  See id.
 116.  See id.
 117.  For coverage of the controversy surrounding passage of the civil-union bill, see 
John Gallagher, Separate But Equal: All Eyes Turn to the Vermont Legislature as It 
Wrestles With a Landmark Court Ruling Regarding Gay Couples, ADVOC., Feb. 1, 
2000, at 28. 
 118.  See Press Release, Lambda Legal, Gay Couples, Clergy, Politicians Join for 
National Freedom to Marry Day (Feb. 7, 2001), http://www.lambdalegal.org/ 
news/ny_20010207_gay-couples-clergy-politicians-join-natl-freedom-to-marry-day.  
 119.  Evan Wolfson, All Together Now, ADVOC., Sept. 11, 2001, at 34. 
 120.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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Texas statute banning same-sex sodomy.121 In May 2003, prior to the 
decision of Lawrence, the need for persuasive arguments in favor of 
same-sex marriage grew when Republican Representative Marilyn 
Musgrave introduced a constitutional amendment that would prohib-
it same-sex marriage.122 Several members of the Coalition responded 
by keeping constitutional arguments about same-sex marriage out of 
the press.123 Those who did make constitutional arguments, however, 
took a number of different approaches. For example, Wolfson, speak-
ing on behalf of what was then called the Freedom to Marry Collabo-
rative, argued that equal protection arguments would be the most 
effective.124 By contrast, when Ruth Harlow of Lambda spoke to the 
press, she stressed that the petitioners in Lawrence were asking only 
for the government “to not have the police prosecute you for choosing 
one particular way to express your love for someone else in pri-
vate.”125 In trying to persuade the Court of their position, Coalition 
members, like the counsel for the petitioners, had reason to adopt a 
number of alternative arguments that might persuade the Court.126
 When Lawrence was decided, various commentators stressed that 
the analytical approach used in the case was hard to identify.127 The 
Court relied, among other things, on historical evidence and prece-
 121.  Id. at 558-60. 
 122.  Frist Backs Putting Gay Marriage Ban in Constitution, WASH. POST, June 30, 
2003, at A2.  
 123.  Beginning in 1995, members of the Coalition took this approach, recommending 
that only receptive members of Congress be approached about the same-sex marriage 
issue. See Memorandum from Evan Wolfson to the Steering Comm. of the Nat’l Freedom to 
Marry Coalition (Sept. 28, 1995), in The PFLAG Papers, The Human Sexuality Archive, 
Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file with Cornell University).  
 124.  Kristin Eliasberg, Pride and Privacy as the Supreme Court Prepares to Hear a 
Landmark Gay-Rights Case, Advocates Debate Strategy, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 2003, 
at E1.  
 125.  Warren Richey, Court Test of Gay Rights vs. Traditional Values, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 25, 2003, at 2. 
 126.  See Amicus Brief of the Human Rights Campaign et al., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102). The briefs submitted in Lawrence similarly offered a variety 
of arguments. For example, the Cato Institute argued that the Texas sodomy statute 
challenged in Lawrence violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Brief of the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at 
27-30, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102). Similarly, the American 
Psychological Association argued, among other things, that homosexuality was normal and 
that the Texas law deprived gays of “fundamental aspects of human experience.” Brief for 
Amici Curiae American Psychological Association et al. in Support of Petitioners, at 3-22, 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102). 
 127.  See, e.g., Matthew Coles, Lawrence v. Texas & the Refinement of Substantive Due 
Process,16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 27-31 (2005); Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of 
Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 66 (2006) (arguing that Lawrence
“compounded the problems of doctrinal clarity and judicial consistency” already plaguing 
substantive due process doctrine); Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas 
and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1612 (2004) (arguing that substantive due 
process doctrine has “now culminated in the utter analytical confusion that is Lawrence,
which offers no guidance at all for the future”). 
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dents decided abroad of “an emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct 
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”128 Explaining that 
the “[s]tate [could] not demean [the petititoners’] existence or control 
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime,” Law-
rence implied that the petitioners’ “right to liberty” gave “them the 
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the gov-
ernment” but never set out a standard of review, explaining only that 
the statute challenged in Lawrence “further[ed] no legitimate state 
interest which [could] justify its intrusion into the personal and pri-
vate life of the individual.”129
 Of course, it is possible to read Lawrence as recognizing that 
equality- and rights-based arguments are inextricably linked. How-
ever, in recognizing the close relationship between equality and liberty 
interests, the Lawrence Court could have framed subsequent debate 
in several ways. First, this framing could have been accomplished by 
using a clear, traditional doctrinal approach, such as the equal pro-
tection analysis suggested by Justice O’Connor in her concurring 
opinion in Lawrence.130 Alternatively, as would be the case in 
Goodridge, the Court could have used or avoided equality rhetoric in 
describing the relationship between the constitutional interests. Un-
surprisingly, because Lawrence used conflicting and sometimes novel 
rhetoric in striking down the Texas sodomy ban, members of the Coa-
lition drew on it to expand their repertoire of claims.  
 For example, some Lambda members described Lawrence as both 
a privacy and an equal rights decision, arguing that “[n]on-gay Amer-
icans are coming to understand that excluding gay people from family 
protections such as access to healthcare . . . is wrong, just as including 
the police in our bedrooms is wrong.”131 In the summer immediately 
after Lawrence was decided, PFLAG members made similarly wide-
ranging arguments in explaining their support for same-sex mar-
riage.132 For example, one suggested that same-sex marriage was an 
issue of equal protection and equal dignity; another argued that mar-
riage was a choice-based right like abortion; and yet another argued 
that marriage was an issue of privacy.133 Because Lawrence was 
open-ended and because its doctrinal underpinnings were relatively 
 128.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).  
 129.  Id. at 578. 
 130.  See id. at 579-85 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 131.  Evan Wolfson, Liberty, Justice and Marriage for All, FORWARD.COM (July 4, 2003), 
http://www.forward.com/articles/7619/. 
 132.  See, e.g., Readers’ and Members’ Comments on Gay Marriage, PFLAG Newsletter 
(Summer 2003), in The PFLAG Papers, The Human Sexuality Archive, Division of Rare 
and Manuscript Collections (on file with Cornell University).  
 133.  See id.
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obscure, the decision did not have the same effect on the arguments 
made by the Coalition that Baker had several years before. 
 The amicus brief joined by Freedom to Marry in Goodridge like-
wise characterized marriage as a constitutionally protected “intimate 
association,”134 based on the “right of privacy”135 and “the right of free 
expression.”136 Instead of highlighting the interests of same-sex 
couples in equal treatment, the amicus brief identified the right to 
same-sex marriage as part of the line of cases explaining constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or “liberty and privacy.”137 In 
closing, the brief stated that marriage was a “unique expressive re-
source”138 protected by state and federal “constitutional guarantees of 
free speech.”139
 After it was announced on November 18, 2003, the Goodridge de-
cision provided an important opportunity for activists to reshape the 
arguments and coalitions stressed by the Coalition. Writing for a 
four-justice majority, Chief Justice Margaret Marshall explained that 
Goodridge was both an equal protection and due process decision.140
Indeed, Marshall acknowledged that, for the purposes of same-sex 
marriage, “the two constitutional concepts . . . overlap[ped].”141 How-
ever, the Goodridge majority consistently stressed civil- and equal-
rights rhetoric in describing the relationship between different 
constitutional protections.142 The court began by explaining “that civil 
marriage [had] long been termed a ‘civil right’ ” entitled to constitu-
tional protection.143 The court also stressed an analogy between 
Goodridge and anti-miscegenation-statute cases like Loving v. Vir-
ginia,144 explaining that in both cases “a statute deprive[d] individu-
als of access to [the] institution of . . . marriage—because of a single 
trait: skin color in . . . Loving, sexual orientation here.”145
 After considering the three state interests offered to justify the 
exclusion of same-sex couples—the creation of an environment favor-
able to procreation, the guarantee of an optimal environment for 
child rearing, and the budgeting of limited financial resources—the 
 134.  See Brief for Professors of Expression and Constitutional Law as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, at 1, 5, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 44, 48, 49, Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860). 
 135.  Id. at 25. 
 136.  Id. at 24, 29. 
 137.  Id. at 25. 
 138.  Id. at 49. 
 139.  Id. at 47. 
 140.  Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 952 (Mass. 2003).  
 141.  Id.
142. Id. at 957-58, 966. 
 143.  Id. at 957. 
 144.  388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage violated the 
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses).  
 145. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958. 
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Goodridge Court held that the statute could not survive rational basis 
review.146 Although the court did not employ only traditional state 
equal protection analysis,147 its decision was steeped in equality-
based rhetoric, including an assertion that “[t]he history of constitu-
tional law ‘is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and 
protections to people once ignored or excluded.’ ”148
 The Freedom to Marry Coalition used Goodridge as a chance to 
reshape its argumentative strategies and to pursue different types of 
alliances. The organization first considered the effect of Goodridge on
its strategy in November 2003 at a staff meeting on civil marriage.149
Some of the arguments emphasized at the meeting were drawn from 
Goodridge itself, including statements that “[m]arriage [was] not static 
[and had] evolved over time” and that marriage was “not solely for 
procreation even as currently constructed.”150 However, more arguments 
drew on the civil rights and equality-based rhetoric used by the 
Goodridge Court.151 One staff member suggested stressing an analogy 
between the victories of the marriage equality movement and “[o]ther 
civil rights advances such as Brown v. Board of Education.”152
 When Coalition members spoke to the press on behalf of Freedom 
to Marry, they not only borrowed the rhetoric of Goodridge but also 
described the decision as primarily an equality-based one. When 
speaking to the Washington Post, for example, Wolfson compared the 
same-sex marriage struggle to the effort to “end . . . race discrimina-
tion in marriage, and women’s subordination in marriage.”153
 Freedom to Marry members continued making equal-rights argu-
ments drawn from Goodridge as members of the Massachusetts State 
Legislature proposed alternatives to same-sex marriage, including a 
state constitutional ban and some form of civil union statute.154 In 
February 2004, when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
clarified that only marriage would satisfy the requirements set forth 
in the Goodridge decision, Coalition members again called Goodridge
a case that was decided “in favor of marriage equality” and was intended 
 146.  Id. at 961-64. 
 147.  Id. at 953. 
 148.  Id. at 966 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996)). 
 149.  Summary of Staff Meeting on Civil Marriage (Nov. 21, 2003), in The PFLAG 
Papers, The Human Sexuality Archive, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file 
with Cornell University). 
 150.  Id.
 151.  Id.
 152.  Id.
 153.  David Von Drehle, Gay Marriage Is a Right, Massachusetts Court Rules, WASH.
POST, Nov. 19, 2003, at A1. 
 154.  For contemporary coverage of the Massachusetts Legislature’s search for 
legislative alternatives, see Frank Phillips & Rick Klein, Lawmakers Are Divided on 
Response, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2003, at A1. 
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to show “that there [was] no good reason to deny same-sex couples 
the equal freedom to marry, as protected by the Constitution.”155
 By the end of 2004, Freedom to Marry was using similar equal 
rights rhetoric in defining its own constitutional values and program 
of reform. As a part of this effort, Coalition members described same-
sex marriage as a civil rights issue that should be supported by racial 
and ethnic minorities. The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, a 
key member of the Coalition, published a report suggesting that 
“black gay and lesbian couples actually have more to gain on average 
from the ability to marry.”156 Sean Cahill, the director of the National 
Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute, argued that constitu-
tional amendments banning same-sex marriage “represent[ed] an 
issue of racial and economic justice.”157 Dr. Kenneth Samuel of the 
Victory Church of Stone Mountain, Georgia, an African-American 
pastor invited to speak by the Task Force, told the press that “homo-
phobia and racism, along with sexism, [were] really three heads to 
the same monster.”158
 In this way, over time, Freedom to Marry came to define its legal 
reform agenda as one of marriage equality.159 By 2004, in a set of 
talking points issued to Freedom to Marry members, leaders de-
scribed the organization as one focused on the “shared goal of secur-
ing full equality and protections under the law,” an organization in-
volved in a “civil rights struggle.”160
B.   The Human Rights Campaign 
 In 1982, the Human Rights Campaign was formed as a federally 
registered political action committee designed to provide financial 
support to political candidates supportive of gay rights.161 From the 
time of its founding, the Human Rights Campaign portrayed itself as 
bipartisan, moderate, and politically influential.162 In its early years, 
 155.  Press Release, Freedom to Marry, Equal Means Equal, Freedom to Marry 
Applauds Latest Massachusetts Court Decision (Feb. 4, 2004), http://www.archive-
freedomtomarry.org/press_center/equal_means_equal.php. 
 156.  The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Black Same-Sex Marriage Households 
Report Conference Call (Oct. 6, 2004), in The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 
Collection, The Human Sexuality Archive, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on 
file with Cornell University). 
 157.  See id. at 4. 
 158.  See id at 9.
 159.  Draft of Talking Points for “Who Is This Group Anyway?” (2004), in The PFLAG 
Papers, The Human Sexuality Archive, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file 
with Cornell University).  
 160.  Id.
 161.  See Michael Oreskes, Dinner By Homosexuals Will Aid Political Drives, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1982, at 25; see also Colman McCarthy, Gay Rights and Gay Acceptance,
WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1982, at A19.  
 162.  See Adam Nagourney, A Movement Divided Between Push and Shove, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1998, at WK3. 
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the organization focused on raising funds for the election of gay-
rights advocates,163 but by the mid-1980s, with the rise of the AIDS 
epidemic, it also promoted funding for AIDS research and legislation 
preventing legal discrimination against gays.164 The Human Rights 
Campaign also played a key role in lobbying for federal legislation 
requiring that records of hate crimes be kept and in advocating re-
forms covering sexual orientation discrimination.165
 In 1996, when the organization first spoke publicly on the issue, 
Elizabeth Birch, the executive director of the Human Rights Cam-
paign, called for gay rights organizations not to focus on same-sex 
marriage.166 Calling it an issue “whose time [had] not yet come,” 
Birch argued that gay rights groups played into the hands of con-
servatives by talking about same-sex marriage.167 Instead, Birch 
argued that groups like the Human Rights Campaign should “get out in 
front and get control of [their] own agenda[s]” by stressing issues that 
enjoyed popular support, especially employment discrimination.168
 In the years between the introduction of the Defense of Marriage 
Act and the decision of Baker, the Human Rights Campaign followed 
the evolution of constitutional arguments for same-sex marriage. The 
Campaign also urged Freedom to Marry and other organizations to 
“fram[e] th[e] issue [of same-sex marriage] in terms of basic human 
rights and individual personal choices,” because “[m]ost voters [did] 
not believe [that] marriage [was] a civil right.”169 The Campaign sup-
ported the efforts of the Freedom to Marry Coalition and made strategy 
recommendations to members of the same-sex marriage movement.170
In particular, the Campaign advised activists not to make equality-
based or civil rights arguments but to assert instead that “[a]dults 
 163.  For an example of early fund-raising goals, see Dudley Clendinen, Throughout the 
Country; Homosexuals Increasingly Flex Political Muscle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1983, at A26.  
 164.  See, e.g., Betty Cuniberti, Aid for Friends of AIDS Research Lavish Washington 
Dinner Raises $130,000 for Campaigns, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1985, at 1; Pierre Thomas, 
Thousands Rejoice at Gay Pride Day; Celebration Deemed The ‘Biggest Ever,’ WASH. POST,
June 19, 1989, at D1.  
 165.  See, e.g., Bush Signs Act Requiring Records on Hate Crimes; Law Called Fruit of 
‘Unprecedented Collaboration’ of Civil Rights, Religious, Gay Groups, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 
1990, at A6. 
 166.  See Hanania, supra note 83. 
 167.  Id.
 168.  Id.
 169.  Marriage: Toughest Battle Lies Ahead, HRC Q. (Winter 1996), in The Human 
Rights Campaign Collection, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file with 
Cornell University). 
 170.  See, e.g., Human Rights Campaign, Talking Points, Same-Sex Marriage: Where 
the Issue Stands, HRC’s Role (Feb. 3, 1997), in The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force 
Collection, The Human Sexuality Archive, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections on 
file with Cornell University).  
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should be free to choose the person with whom they want to spend 
their life.”171
 In public, by contrast, leaders of the organization did not speak 
about same-sex marriage or the constitutionality of existing marriage 
laws. Instead, Human Rights Campaign organizers worked to shift 
the nation’s attention to more popular gay rights issues, such as 
“hospital visitation” or “guardianship” rights.172 Primarily, the Campaign 
avoided an endorsement of same-sex marriage, focusing instead on 
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The 
Human Rights Campaign led efforts to pass a federal Employment 
Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) and lobbied heavily for employment 
discrimination protections for gay civil service employees.173
 Indeed, when the organization first circulated a pamphlet about 
same-sex marriage in the summer of 1999, the Human Rights Cam-
paign adopted a strategy similar to the one used in the ENDA cam-
paign—activists would avoid constitutional arguments and would 
instead draw attention to any positive change in popular opinion. 
In a pamphlet about the views of religious leaders on same-sex mar-
riage, for example, the Human Rights Campaign characterized 
intense debate within religious communities as “a sign of [the] pro-
gress” of popular opinion on the issue.174
 Leaders of the Campaign initially did not make use of Baker or
even focus on the issue of same-sex marriage. In supporting the pres-
idential candidacy of Al Gore, for example, Elizabeth Birch spoke not 
about same-sex marriage but about hate crimes and employment dis-
crimination.175 In Vermont, as Democratic legislators were ousted in 
the 2000 elections for supporting civil union legislation, the Human 
Rights Campaign even considered supporting a Republican candidate 
who had not endorsed the civil union law.176
 However, in May of 2003, when the organization took a public 
stand in support of same-sex marriage and condemned the introduc-
tion of an anti-same-sex-marriage constitutional amendment, the 
group drew heavily on the rhetoric and reasoning of Baker. Birch 
borrowed the equality-based arguments that had emerged in Baker,
 171.  See Human Rights Campaign, supra note 97.
 172.  For examples of the focus of the Human Rights Campaign in the late 1990s, see
Democrats Give Health Benefits to Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1997, at 11; Carolyn 
Lochhead, Senate OKs Gay Marriage Restriction—Job Discrimination Bill Fails by One 
Vote, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 11, 1996, at A1. 
 173.  For coverage of ENDA and the group’s involvement, see, for example, Aline 
McKenzie, Elizabeth Birch, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 15, 1998, at 1J. 
 174.  Mary Leonard, Activists Applaud Report on Churches, Gays, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 
12, 1999, at A5 (describing the pamphlet circulated by the organization).  
 175.  See Robin Toner, A Gay Rights Rally Over Gains and Goals, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 
2000, at A14. 
 176.  See Ben White, Vermont Divisions Harden Over Civil Unions Law, WASH. POST,
Sept. 17, 2000, at A6. 
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stating that the Constitution was “designed to protect the basic 
equality and civil rights of all Americans.”177 In explaining the organ-
ization’s position on the constitutionality of same-sex marriage laws, 
Birch argued that “[t]he bottom line on the issue of marriage [was] 
that gay and lesbian couples deserve the same rights and protections 
that most other American families take for granted.”178 Baker helped 
to legitimate and make salient this particular kind of claim. 
 Because Lawrence was rhetorically and doctrinally ambiguous, 
members of the Campaign made a variety of equality- and rights- 
based arguments in the immediate aftermath of the decision. For 
example, Winnie Stachelberg, the organization’s political director, 
criticized supporters of the anti-same-sex-marriage amendment for 
not having “read the opinion in the Lawrence case,” which was “first 
and foremost about affirming every American’s right to privacy.”179
To support the constitutional amendment, Stachelberg argued, would 
be to “erase the right to privacy.”180
 The wide range of arguments made after Lawrence was also re-
flected in the organization’s July 2003 “Rapid Response Campaign,” a 
program designed to capitalize on a potential victory in Goodridge.181
The $1,000,000 campaign was intended to “frame the debate and 
shape public opinion about civil marriage for gay and lesbian cou-
ples” through polling, public education, and lobbying.182 In addition to 
emphasizing equal protection arguments,183 members of the Human 
Rights Campaign were instructed to argue that “[m]arriage ought to 
be a matter of individual personal decision,” a privacy interest like 
the one described in Lawrence.184 As the Lawrence Court was thought 
to have done, Human Rights Campaign members were also told to 
state that “[t]he decision of whom to marry should be left to individu-
als—not dictated by the government.”185
Goodridge again allowed Campaign members to shift the balance 
of arguments used by its members, this time increasing the promi-
nence of equal protection and civil rights contentions. In a public 
 177.  Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, HRC Condemns Introduction of Anti-
Gay Constitutional Amendment (May 28, 2003), in The Human Rights Collection, Division 
of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file with Cornell University). 
 178.  Id.
 179.  Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, HRC Denounces Frist’s Attack on Gay 
Families (June 30, 2003), in The Human Rights Collection, Division of Rare and 
Manuscript Collection (on file with Cornell University).  
 180.  Id.
181.  See Letter from Human Rights Campaign, HRC’s Rapid Response Campaign (July 
2003), in The Human Rights Collection, Divison of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file 
with Cornell University).  
 182.  Id.
 183.  Id.
 184.  Id.
 185.  Id.
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education initiative, the Human Rights Campaign noted that the 
Goodridge Court had stated that same-sex couples had been “exclud-
ed from the full range of human experience and denied full protection 
of the laws” and that same-sex marriage would not diminish the value 
of existing marriages “any more than recognizing the right of an indi-
vidual to marry a person of a different race devalues . . . marriage.”186
 In its new 2004 campaign against a proposed federal antimarriage 
amendment, the Human Rights Campaign borrowed the civil rights 
and equality-based rhetoric of Goodridge.187 The Campaign claimed 
that “[t]o settle for anything less than full equality on th[e] issue [of 
marriage rights] would be a setback for [the] movement” and would 
“impose second-class citizenship for gays.”188 To illustrate this point, 
the organization compared the same-sex marriage movement to the 
civil rights movement:  
Few know that when Rosa Parks and Dr. King began the Mont-
gomery Bus Boycott, they were not asking for full desegregation 
and equality in public transportation, just more consideration of 
African Americans in an already segregated public transport sys-
tem. But once the battle was joined by the other side, with the big-
ots refusing any compromise, the Montgomery movement had no 
choice but to escalate their demands. . . . On same-sex marriage, 
the LGBT community has reached a similar juncture.189
 In the years immediately following Goodridge, the Human Rights 
Campaign continued drawing on the decision’s equality-based rheto-
ric in its own advocacy. In marking the anniversary of Goodridge in
2004, for example, the Campaign praised the decision for recognizing 
the importance of “equality under the law.”190 The organization also 
began sponsoring events in order to show that the same-sex marriage 
movement was a civil rights movement. In June of 2004, the organi-
zation held a press conference attended by prominent African Ameri-
can clergymen and civil rights leaders who also opposed the federal 
 186.  Memorandum, Human Rights Campaign, Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health: Civil Marriage Equality Is Required by the Massachusetts Constitution (Dec. 
2003), in The Human Rights Collection, Divison of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file 
with Cornell University); Key Statements on FMA/Marriage/Goodridge: Nov. 18 – Dec. 5, 
2003, in The Human Rights Collection, Divison of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file 
with Cornell University); see also Letter from Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, 
Oppose the Federal Marriage Amendment (Sept. 3, 2003), in The Human Rights Collection, 
Divison of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file with Cornell University).
 187.  Letter from Robin Tyler & Andy Thayer, National Co-organizers, 
DontAmend.com, Don’t Amend: Gay Marriage Is Our Right, in The Human Rights 
Collection, Divison of Rare and Manuscript Collections (on file with Cornell University).  
 188.  Id.
 189.  Id.
 190.  Human Rights Campaign, HRC Statement on Anniversary of Goodridge Marriage 
Decision, HRC.ORG (Nov. 18, 2004), http://www.hrc.org/press-releases/entry/hrc-statement-
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marriage amendment.191 In a press release about the event, the 
Campaign stressed its alliance with the National Black Justice Coali-
tion and reiterated its view that “[n]o one [knew] the cost of restrict-
ing rights better than African-Americans.”192 Later, in 2005, the or-
ganization gave a “National Civil Rights Award” to former NAACP 
Chairman Julian Bond in recognition of his support for Goodridge 
and same-sex marriage.193
 Over time, the Campaign increasingly described same-sex mar-
riage in terms used by the courts in Baker and Goodridge. In the fall 
of 2003, the organization had primarily described marriage as an is-
sue of intimate association, personal choice, and constitutional priva-
cy. By 2005, and partly because of Goodridge, the right to marry had 
become a right to “marriage equality.”194
C.   The Changing Opposition 
 Between 1995 and 2006, major organizations opposed to the legal-
ization of same-sex marriage also changed their rhetorical strategies 
and did so partly in response to the success their opponents had in 
drawing on the rhetoric of the Baker and Goodridge decisions. Before 
the issuance of these opinions, major New Right organizations often 
described the same-sex marriage debate as a referendum on the legit-
imacy or social acceptance of homosexuality or emphasized claims 
that same-sex marriage would undermine the nuclear family and 
heterosexual marriage. Goodridge, and the use of it by the same-sex 
marriage movement, forced these groups to rework some of their ar-
gumentative strategies in a way that may well have benefited the 
same-sex marriage cause. The opinion helped to increase the promi-
nence of equality-based and civil rights claims made by proponents of 
same-sex marriage. In part because of Goodridge, anti-same-sex-
marriage activists responded by focusing less on the social harms 
produced by gay couples and more on the freedom of belief and the 
parental rights of citizens potentially opposed to same-sex marriage.  
 191.  Human Rights Campaign, HRC Joins African-American Church Leaders in 
Opposition to Federal Marriage Amendment, HRC.ORG (June 24, 2004), 
http://www.hrc.org/press-releases/entry/hrc-joins-african-american-church-leaders-in-
opposition-to-federal-marriage.  
 192.  See id.
 193.  See Press Release, Human Rights Campaign, Human Rights Campaign Marks 
25th Anniversary at National Dinner (Oct. 3, 2005), http://www.hrc.org/press-releases/ 
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 194.  For an overview of the organization’s current activities in this vein, see MARRIAGE
EQUALITY, http://www.marriageequality.org/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). 
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D.   The Traditional Values Coalition 
 Founded in 1980 by the Reverend Louis Sheldon, the Traditional 
Values Coalition, or TVC, is a lobbying group representing 43,000 
churches.195 Before founding the TVC, Sheldon already had focused a 
significant part of his political career on opposing gay rights. His en-
try into politics came with the ultimately unsuccessful 1977 Califor-
nia initiative, sponsored by state legislator John Briggs, that would 
have allowed school boards to dismiss or deny employment to “open 
and notorious homosexuals.”196 In 1978 Sheldon also played a key 
role in campaigning for a failed initiative requiring the dismissal of 
all openly gay public school teachers.197
 With the formation of the TVC in 1980, Sheldon embraced a vision 
of legal reform that drew on Christian religious teachings and an 
originalist interpretation of the Constitution. As the TVC explained 
in its mission statement:  
Traditional Values are based upon biblical foundations and upon 
the principles outlined in the Declaration of Independence, our 
Constitution, the writings of the Founding Fathers, and upon the 
writings of great political and religious thinkers throughout the ages. 
. . . .
 In short, Bible-based traditional values are what created and 
what have preserved our nation. We will lose our freedoms if we 
reject these values.198
 Sheldon’s reform vision was at its most influential between 1990 
and 1994 when the TVC campaigned against state- and municipal-
level laws banning sexual orientation discrimination in employment, 
housing, and public accommodations. After 1991, when the TVC suc-
cessfully led lobbying efforts to convince California Governor Pete 
Wilson to veto an anti-sexual-orientation-discrimination employment 
law, the TVC expanded its campaign, sponsoring “anti-special-rights” 
legislation and constitutional amendments in Colorado, Arizona, Or-
egon, Washington, and Missouri.199
 The Baehr decision did make opposition to same-sex marriage an 
organizational priority for the TVC, however, Sheldon framed the 
issue not as one about the propriety of same-sex marriage but instead 
 195.  About TVC, TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION, http://traditionalvalues.org/ 
content/about (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). 
 196.  Grace Lichtenstein, California Homosexuals Prepare for Schools Battle, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1977, at 35. See also David W. Dunlap, Minister Brings Anti-Gay Message to 
the Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1994, at A16. 
 197.  Dunlap, supra note 196.
 198.  About TVC, supra note 195. 
 199.  See Steven A. Holmes, Gay Rights Advocates Brace for Ballot Fights, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1994, at A17. 
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as a referendum on the legitimacy of homosexuality. He criticized 
Baehr by explaining that “[w]hat [gays] really want[ed] [was] ac-
ceptance, and that [was] something we [could not] give to them.”200
Moreover, in working closely with the wave of “family values” Repub-
licans elected to Congress in 1994, Sheldon focused as much on cam-
paigning for “anti-special-rights” legislation as he did on opposing 
same-sex marriage.201
 Between 1995 and 2003, as the TVC partnered with other New 
Right organizations in campaigning for state and federal defense-of-
marriage legislation, Sheldon continued to emphasize the broader 
harm that a “homosexual lifestyle” would do to American culture and 
gender relations rather than the effect that same-sex marriage would 
have on straight unions. In 1996, for example, while campaigning for 
a defense-of-marriage measure in California, Sheldon told the Balti-
more Daily Record that “[l]egalizing homosexual marriage would 
place our youth at risk, in addition to having a disastrous effect on 
individual citizens, businesses, churches and practically every seg-
ment of our society.”202 In 1997, Sheldon expanded on this critique, 
proposing that legalizing same-sex marriage would result in the 
“degendering” of America.203
 It was the Goodridge opinion that helped to reshape the TVC’s 
rhetorical strategies. Before Goodridge, members of the TVC focused 
not on marriage itself but on the damage that social acceptance of 
homosexuality would do to American culture. Partly because of 
Goodridge and the success that same-sex marriage groups had in 
drawing on it, the TVC deemphasized these claims, stressing instead 
that a majority in the United States opposed same-sex marriage: 
as one representative explained in 2003, “[w]e have found that the 
more people focus on [same-sex marriage], the less they support 
it.”204 In the winter of 2004, the TVC elaborated on this strategy, 
bringing African-American ministers to condemn marriage equality 
and to join in a “state-by-state grassroots effort to pass legislation 
protecting marriage.”205
 200.  Bettina Boxall, Hawaii Justice Opens Door to Legalizing Gay Marriages Law: 
State High Court Calls Ban Unconstitutional and Orders a Trial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 
1995, at 1. 
 201.  See Holmes, supra note 199. 
 202.  California Gay Marriage Ban Encounters First Senate Test, DAILY REC., July 10, 
1996, at 1. 
 203.  See Evan Wolfson, How to Win the Freedom to Marry, 4 HARV. GAY & LESBIAN
REV. 29, 30 (1997) (quoting Rev. Lou Sheldon).  
 204.  See Katherine Q. Seelye & Janet Elder, Poll: America Widely Against Gay 
Marriage, TIMES ARGUS, Dec. 21, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 18711590 (quoting Rev. 
Lou Sheldon).
 205.  Don Lattin, Black Clergy Gathering to Fight Gay Matrimony, S.F. CHRON., May 
15, 2004, at A4. 
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 The campaign, which insisted that “gay marriage is not a civil 
right,”206 downplayed direct criticism of gay couples and highlighted 
arguments that gays were engaged in “destructive” but “curable” 
behavior.207 Instead of framing their struggle as one against a malig-
nant “homosexual agenda,” TVC members focused on refuting the 
civil rights rhetoric of Goodridge.208 The TVC also claimed to represent 
the freedoms of those with religious objections to same-sex marriage: 
as one spokesman put it, “I think people, for the most part, are fed up 
with this issue being shoved in their face.”209
E.   Focus on the Family 
 Founded in 1977 by child psychologist and minister Reverend 
James Dobson, Focus on the Family is a nonprofit corporation and 
Christian media outlet that currently reaches 5,000 radio and televi-
sion stations in 155 countries.210 Led exclusively by Dobson from the 
time of its founding until 2003, Focus exercises policy influence pri-
marily through its radio broadcasts, television programs, and film 
series.211 However, Dobson and his successors, Don Hodel (named to 
the position in 2003) and Jim Daly (named to the position in 2005), 
have routinely been active in electoral and legislative campaigns, as 
well as in public interest litigation.212
 Between 1985 and 1999, Dobson and Focus highlighted legitimacy-
based and defense-of-marriage claims. In a summer 1998 fundraising 
letter, for example, Dobson presented the same-sex marriage struggle 
as a referendum on the social acceptability of homosexuality, arguing 
that the “highly coordinated . . . effort[s]” to establish same-sex mar-
riage were not the true focus of gay activists.213 Instead, as he wrote, 
 206.  R. CLAIRE SNYDER, GAY MARRIAGE AND DEMOCRACY: EQUALITY FOR ALL 117 (2006).
 207.  See Hanna Rosin, A Family Business: For the Rev. Lou Sheldon and his Daughter, 
Marriage Means Only One Thing, WASH. POST, May 20, 2004, at C1 (describing the “Gay 
Marriage Is Not a Civil Right” Campaign).
 208.  See id.
 209.  See Jim Sanders, Gay Couples to Acquire New Rights: Domestic Partnerships Will 
Soon Gain Marriagelike Protections and Obligations, but Not Everyone is Celebrating, SAC-
RAMENTO BEE, Dec. 31, 2004, at A3.
 210.  See Hans Johnson, Onward, Christian Soldiers: Christian Radio Proves a Potent 
Medium for Antigay Politics, ADVOC., Feb. 15, 2000, at 30. 
 211.  See id.
 212. For coverage of the transitions between different presidents of Focus, see Rival 
Prayer Events Slated, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 20, 2003, at A17 (discussing 
Dobson taking a diminished role); Historical Timeline: A Look at the First 30 Years of 
Focus on the Family, FOCUS ON THE FAMILY, http://www.focusonthefamily.com/about_us/ 
news_room/history.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2012).  
 213.  See James C. Dobson, Cult and Fringe Christianity Studies: The Error of Homo-
sexuality, BIBLETEACHER.ORG, http://www.bibleteacher.org/Dm073.htm (last visited Apr. 
25, 2012). 
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“Most importantly, activists want homosexuality to be seen and sanc-
tioned as the moral equivalent of heterosexuality.”214
 However, in a November 1999 fundraising campaign, Dobson 
identified same-sex marriage as a greater threat to the institution of 
marriage than no-fault divorce or premarital cohabitation, for only 
same-sex marriage was argued to “destroy the legal underpinnings of 
the family.”215 Similar arguments remained at the center of Focus’s 
strategy through the winter of 2000 when Focus activists played key 
roles in the battle for a defense-of-marriage act in California. As Dob-
son wrote in a fundraising letter: “If homosexuals are permitted to 
marry, then the entire legal basis for the family [will be] undermined. 
. . . Marriage would mean anything—or, more likely, nothing at all.”216
Goodridge marked a significant shift in the organization’s argu-
mentative strategies. By March 2004, Focus had become a prominent 
member of the Arlington Group, a coalition of conservative organiza-
tions and leaders opposed to same-sex marriage.217 The following 
May, when serving as the keynote speaker at Mayday for Marriage, 
an important opposition event, Dobson demonstrated a different rhe-
torical strategy, one highlighting not only the threat posed by gays to 
heterosexual marriage but also the harmful effects that same-sex 
marriage would have on public schools’ curricular programming.218
First, Dobson openly denounced homophobia, suggesting that Focus 
members were “not here to harm or disrespect” the gay activists present 
at a counter-rally.219 Dobson further emphasized that proponents of 
same-sex marriage, not its opponents, promoted discrimination.220 He 
stressed that same-sex marriage would deny parents the right to 
raise their children as they saw fit, for “[p]ublic schools [would] be 
used as propaganda machines for the gay agenda.”221
 Dobson built on this strategy after 2004 when he founded Focus 
on the Family Action, a 501(c)(4) organization more involved in elec-
toral politics than Focus on the Family, a 501(c)(3) corporation—a 
nonprofit corporation.222 Parental-rights arguments were featured 
prominently in 2006 in political advertisements run by Focus Action 
 214.  Id.
 215.  Ross, supra note 88, at 265 n.50.  
 216.  Letter from James Dobson, Protecting Marriage: California Voters Will Decide the 
Future of Marriage (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.beliefnet.com/Love-Family/ 
2000/03/Protecting-Marriage.aspx.  
 217.  See David Von Drehle & Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Marriage Vaulted Into 
Spotlight, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2004, at A1.  
 218.  See Love and Marriage; Christian Message Undercut by Arrest, STRANGER, May 
19, 2004, at 14. 
 219.  Id.
 220.  See id. 
 221.  Id.
 222.  See Brian MacQuarrie, Dobson Turns Spiritual Empire Into Political Clout, BOS-
TON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 2005, at A1.
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during congressional races as is exemplified by the one run against 
Ken Salazar of Colorado.223 Later, in September 2006 at the Values 
Voter Summit, an annual event sponsored by the Family Research 
Council, a sister organization, Focus Action and other groups at the 
summit spoke in favor of a similar strategy in response to Goodridge.
As reported in the New York Times, Focus Action activists “said they 
were taking up the argument that legal recognition of same-sex mar-
riages would cramp the free expression of religious groups who con-
sider such unions a sin.”224
 This strategy was further clarified during the 2008 campaign for 
Proposition Eight, a state constitutional initiative in California pro-
posed to overrule a state supreme court decision requiring access to 
marriage for same-sex couples.225 Focus Action funded and helped to 
design advertisements that did not directly challenge the equality 
claims made in Goodridge. Instead, the Focus Action advertisements 
drew on the equality rhetoric from Goodridge as supporting a right to 
oppose same-sex marriage.226 If same-sex marriage were legalized in 
California, the advertisements reasoned, “[m]inisters [would] be 
jailed if they preach[ed] against homosexuality” and “[p]arents 
[would] have no right to prevent their children from being taught in 
school about same-sex marriage.”227 Instead of concentrating on the 
potential flaws with the equality-based language in Goodridge, Focus 
borrowed from it. As recently as 2011, Dobson has continued to insist 
that “if same sex marriage is legalized and the rest of the gay agenda 
is achieved, the church will be subjected to ever-increasing oppres-
sion and discrimination.”228
F.   The Family Research Council 
 Formerly a part of Focus on the Family, the Family Research 
Council was founded in 1981 to pursue “value-based” lobbying about 
legal reforms concerning divorce, homosexuality, and other issues 
about which Focus could do only a limited amount of lobbying with-
 223.  Jim Rutenberg, Conservatives Watching Senate Debate on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2006, at A19. 
 224.  David D. Kirkpatrick, Christian Conservatives Look to Re-Energize Base, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at A16.  
 225.  For a description of Proposition Eight, see Janet Kornblum, Post-Prop 8, 
Thousands Join Protest: Gay-Marriage Ban in California Stirs Torchbearers, USA TODAY,
Nov. 14, 2008, at 3A. 
 226.  Laurie Goodstein, California, a Line in the Sand for Same-Sex Marriage Foes,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2008, at A12. 
 227.  Id.
 228.  Marriage Under Fire, MONTHLY NEWSL. (Dr. James Dobson’s Family Talk, Colorado 
Springs, Colo.) (July 2011), available at http://drjamesdobson.org/About/Commentaries/ 
marriage_under_fire (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). 
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out risking its nonprofit status.229 After formally separating from 
Focus in 1992, the Council pursued several activities in addition to 
its lobbying, engaging in public interest litigation and sending educa-
tional materials to possible supporters.230
 In the early 1990s, under the leadership of former Reagan policy 
advisor Gary Bauer, the Council emphasized policy reforms unrelat-
ed to sex and sexuality. In 1992, for example, Bauer suggested that 
the group’s chief concern was with the lax Bush Administration policy 
on “unwholesome TV programming and other threats to children.”231
In the early 1990s, the Council also addressed the issue of religious 
harassment and discrimination, campaigning for changes in the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Guidelines on reli-
gious harassment and discrimination and promoting the ultimately 
unsuccessful Religious Equality Amendment.232
 After Baehr brought new attention to the same-sex marriage issue 
in 1993, the Council, as had Focus on the Family, portrayed the issue 
of same-sex marriage as one involving the acceptability of homosexu-
ality as a lifestyle. In responding to the Baehr decision, Robert 
Knight of the Council told the New York Times that the decision 
should be condemned because it was “part of the pan-sexual move-
ment’s attempt to deconstruct . . . morality in the culture.”233 Council 
leaders like Knight and Bauer continued to stress legitimacy-based 
arguments during hearings about the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act. When testifying before Congress in favor of the federal Defense 
of Marriage Act in 1996, Bauer explained that accepting same-sex 
marriage would require Congress to “restructure our entire sexual 
morality and social system to embrace a concept that has never been 
accepted anywhere in the world by any major culture.”234
 229.  See History/Mission: A Quarter Century of Advancing Faith, Family and Freedom,
FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, http://www.frc.org/historymission (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). 
 230.  See id.
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at A16. 
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Religious Equality Amendment proposed to overrule Supreme Court decisions forbidding 
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Judiciary, 104th Cong. 22 (1996) (statement of Gary L. Bauer, President, Family Re-
search Council). 
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 It was only in responding to the Baker decision that the Council 
began emphasizing defense-of-marriage rather than legitimacy-based 
claims. For example, in February 2000, Bauer identified Baker as “an 
unmitigated disaster for the American family.”235 The following 
March, the Council’s chief spokesperson Janet Parshall employed a 
similar rhetorical strategy, explaining that opposition to same-sex 
marriage was necessary for the “defense of marriage.”236 As Parshall 
explained, “Giving same-sex relationships or out-of-wedlock hetero-
sexual couples the same special status and benefits as the marital 
bond would not be the expansion of a right but the destruction of a 
principle.”237 Before the winter of 2003, the Council emphasized 
similar claims in opposing a proposed domestic-partnership law in 
California and a Vermont civil union measure introduced in response 
to Baker. As then-Council President Kevin Connor explained in the 
organization’s newsletter, same-sex unions posed the most “serious 
threat to marriage since the states foolishly chose no-fault divorce in 
the 1960s.”238
Goodridge prompted Council leaders to reconsider such argumen-
tative strategies. In February 2004, the Council sponsored adver-
tisements not directly justifying unequal treatment of gay couples 
but rather focusing on public schools’ curricular programming.239 In 
particular, the advertisements claimed that “[c]ertainly teachers 
would have to teach that marriage has more than one option.”240 In 
September 2004, the Council sponsored a simulcast, titled the “Battle 
for Marriage,” emphasizing claims that same-sex marriage would 
“threaten religious freedom and force schools to teach homosexuality 
as an acceptable lifestyle.”241
 In the fall of 2006, at the Values for Voters Summit, Tony Perkins, 
a leader of the Council, did not focus on criticizing Goodridge but 
instead emphasized the equality interests of opponents of same-sex 
marriage.242 Invoking Goodridge, Perkins contended that “the ad-
vancement of same-sex marriage” threatened “religious liberties.”243
In a promotional film circulated throughout the evangelical commu-
 235.  Gallagher, supra note 117, at 29-30. 
 236.  Press Release, Family Research Council, FRC Reports: California Citizens Send 
Message to States - Leave Marriage Alone, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 8, 2000). 
 237.  Id.
 238.  Press Release, Family Research Council, FRC: Civil Unions Bill Shelved Due to 
Grass Roots Pressure, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 15, 2002).
 239.  Press Release, Family Research Council, FRC Action Targets Boston Airwaves 
with Same-Sex ‘Marriage’ Ad Campaign, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 3, 2004).
 240.  Id.
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 242.  Michael Paulson, Group to Rally Opposition to Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 
15, 2006, at A1. 
 243.  Id.
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nity, Perkins urged believers to “[g]et involved . . . before religious 
liberty is lost forever.”244
 In the lead-up to the “Yes on Proposition Eight” Campaign, the 
Council further refined the religious-liberty and parental-rights 
arguments developed in response to Goodridge. In July 2008, the 
Council sponsored a panel discussion centering on these claims and 
addressing “Religious Liberty and . . . Counterfeit Marriage.”245 The 
panel focused on “the threat posed to First Amendment rights and 
religious liberty protections” and asked whether “churches [would] be 
able to deny marri[age to] homosexual couples” and whether “Chris-
tian organizations [would be able to] retain their religious identity 
and beliefs” if same-sex marriage were legalized.246 The Council’s 
advertisements that ran during the “Yes on Prop 8” Campaign also 
drew on the parental-rights claims forged in response to Goodridge,
as promotional materials insisted that Proposition Eight has “every-
thing to do with schools.”247
 The Council’s new argumentative emphasis had been crafted in 
response to Goodridge. Because Goodridge had drawn considerable 
attention to the issue of equal treatment, the Council downplayed 
claims that homosexuals could never and should never be treated 
with dignity or respect. Instead, Council members accepted the 
Goodridge Court’s concern about discrimination in the same-sex mar-
riage debate. However, as the 2008 panel discussion illustrated, 
Council activists presented religious opponents of same-sex marriage, 
not gays or lesbians, as the ones likely to be subject to discrimination.  
V. RHETORICAL STAKES: SHIFTING COALITIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS
 Baker and Goodridge helped to shift the argumentative strategies 
adopted by organizations on either side of the same-sex marriage de-
bate, empowering same-sex marriage advocates who wanted to make 
different and previously disfavored claims. It is worth considering the 
impact that these decisions had on the alliances, as well as on the 
arguments, in the struggle. Leading studies acknowledge that major 
decisions like Baker and Goodridge have impacted the same-sex mar-
riage debate, but current scholarship suggests that the effects of these 
decisions have been clearly and almost primarily negative for the 
same-sex marriage movement. However, as we shall see, Goodridge
 244.  Kirkpatrick, supra note 224. 
 245.  Press Release, Family Research Council, FRC to Host Panel Discussion on 
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 246.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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also appears to have been an important tool to those within the 
same-sex marriage movement seeking to build new alliances.  
 It is difficult to say whether the same-sex marriage movement will 
benefit from its new set of alliances in the long term. However, before 
assessing whether Goodridge or Baker advanced the same-sex mar-
riage cause, current studies must recognize that the players and 
terms of that debate have fundamentally changed. Similarly, it is 
possible that the litigation of Perry or Gill may reshape the coalitions 
in the debate in a way that would be advantageous for the same-sex 
marriage movement.  
 These changes become apparent when one studies the same-sex 
marriage debate in Massachusetts between 1999 and 2006. Two of 
the major players in the debate in this period were MGLPC and 
GLAD. Founded in 1973, MGLPC is a state-level, professional lobby-
ing organization focused on gay rights issues.248 Before 1995 MGLPC 
had focused on HIV confidentiality legislation and antidiscrimination 
laws targeting employment and public accommodations.249 As we 
shall see, MGLPC began, in the mid-1990s, to commit more resources 
to securing legal recognition for same-sex couples. MGLPC was part-
nered in this effort by GLAD, a regional, litigation-oriented organiza-
tion founded in 1978.250
A.   Alliance-Building, Unions, and Libertarians 
 Before 1999 neither organization campaigned directly or made 
constitutional arguments in favor of constitutional marriage. GLAD 
and MGLPC focused instead on providing some same-sex couples 
benefits that ordinarily came through marriage, but the organiza-
tions did not demand legal recognition for same-sex relationships 
themselves. Chief among these efforts was Senate Bill 1332, a bill 
that would make health insurance available to same-sex partners of 
active or retired public employees.251 In essence, the bill created a 
domestic partnership status, complete with procedures for establish-
ing and terminating such partnerships. 
 However, Massachusetts organizations did not argue that same-
sex relationships themselves were deserving of legal recognition or 
 248.  See PATRICIA A. GOZEMBA & KAREN KAHN, COURTING EQUALITY: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF AMERICA’S FIRST LEGAL SAME-SEX MARRIAGES 38 (2007).  
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Law Is Voted in Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1989, at A27; Jane Meredith Adams, 
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TON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1987, at 33. 
 250.  See About GLAD, GLAD, http://www.glad.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2012). 
 251.  Memorandum from A. Joseph DeNucci, Auditor of the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts, to Byron Rushing, House Chairman, Joint Comm. on Pub. Serv. (June 29, 1995), 
The Massachusetts Gay and Lesbian Political Caucus Papers (on file with the 
Northeastern University Archives). 
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equal legal treatment.252 Instead, in 1998, gay rights groups agreed 
with MGLPC co-chair Arline Isaacson’s view that domestic partner-
ships were merely an “issue . . . about equal pay for equal work.”253
When domestic partnerships were described as an equal pay issue, 
labor organizations and their allies were more likely to support 
the measure. In Massachusetts, for example, the Board of the Mas-
sachusetts American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO) endorsed the domestic partnership bill 
in 1998.254
 Before Goodridge the groups also stressed that same-sex marriage 
was an issue of constitutional privacy. Groups like GLAD and 
MGLPC first made such constitutional arguments in favor of same-
sex marriage in 1998 in response to a defense of marriage bill filed in 
the Massachusetts legislature.255 At the same time the Massachusetts 
DOMA bill was filed, libertarian organizations also proposed one 
abolishing restrictions on same-sex marriage and plural marriages 
and another eliminating any laws that punished “bedroom crimes.”256
Gay rights organizations expressed interest in supporting the bill 
so long as it stated that “the right of two adults to marry is a funda-
mental one.”257
 Over time state gay rights organizations themselves began de-
scribing same-sex marriage as an issue of constitutional privacy. 
MGPLC and the Religious Coalition for the Freedom to Marry sent 
out brochures “affirm[ing] the liberty of adults of the same gender to 
love and marry” and “insist[ing] that no one, especially the state, 
[should] coerce people into marriage, or bar two consenting adults of 
the same gender from” marrying.258
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 In turn, members of the coalition supporting same-sex marriage in 
Massachusetts in 2000 viewed marriage as a privacy or equal-pay 
issue. In 2000 the Massachusetts Freedom to Marry Coalition count-
ed several unions as existing “coalition partners,” including the 
National Association of Social Workers and the Libertarian Party.259
Organizations that campaigned for the rights of racial or ethnic mi-
norities, such as the NAACP, were only “prospect[ive]” allies.260
B.   Alliance-Building and Civil Rights 
 In 2003, however, Goodridge affected the shape of this coalition by 
reframing same-sex marriage as an issue of constitutional equality. 
Because it made the question of civil rights more central in the ar-
gumentative strategies of both opponents and proponents of same-sex 
marriage, Goodridge provided a valuable tool for gay rights activists 
seeking to establish alliances with civil rights organizations. MGLPC 
began stressing that Goodridge had been a historic civil rights victo-
ry, and Arline Isaacson, a member of the group, compared opponents 
of Goodridge to racists refusing to desegregate public schools after 
Brown v. Board of Education.261 The organization also asked the 
Massachusetts Democratic State Committee to endorse a resolution, 
stating that support for Goodridge required recognition that “[a]ll 
people should be treated equally and fairly under the law.”262 GLAD 
similarly described civil unions or any legal status short of marriage 
as “separate and unequal.”263
 Increasingly, and partly because of Goodridge, the debate about 
same-sex marriage became a discussion about the meaning of consti-
tutional equality and the legacy of the civil rights movement. In the 
weeks following the decision of Goodridge, prominent African Ameri-
cans discussed whether same-sex marriage could properly be considered 
an issue of constitutional equality. Carol Moseley Braun and Al 
Sharpton equated the same-sex marriage movement with the civil 
rights movement.264 Other civil rights leaders, like Julian Bond of the 
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NAACP and members of the National Black Justice Coalition, joined 
the debate in support of “marriage equality.”265
 By contrast, other African-American leaders claimed that same-
sex marriage was a “special rights” issue because sexuality was a 
matter of behavior rather than race or ethnicity.266 By February 2004, 
a number of African-American churches had come out against 
Goodridge and its constitutional justification for same-sex mar-
riage.267 In a radio advertisement aired by opponents of Goodridge,
a prominent African-American minister stated that “[s]ame-sex 
marriage [was] no civil rights issue.”268
 By 2004, alliance-building in the same-sex marriage debate out-
side of Massachusetts had also focused on constitutional equality and 
the legacy of the civil rights movement. In December of 2004, Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s daughter Bernice Albertine King led 10,000 
marchers calling for the civil rights movement to speak with “a uni-
fied voice” against same-sex marriage and in favor of “basic, funda-
mental moral beliefs.”269 At the same time, Coretta Scott King and 
other members of the civil rights movement publicly supported the 
same-sex marriage movement and its claims of constitutional equali-
ty.270 In the winter of 2005, Mark Leno, another prominent civil 
rights leader and pastor, proposed a same-sex marriage bill in the 
California Legislature.271 When asked why he supported the measure, 
Leno explained that the bill should be endorsed by anyone “call[ing] 
for equal rights.”272
 Further debate about the meaning of constitutional equality and 
the legacy of the civil rights movement played out in the courts. In 
2006 in Lewis v. Harris,273 a New Jersey same-sex marriage case, the 
National Black Justice Coalition, an organization composed of 3,000 
gay, lesbian, and transgender African Americans, submitted a brief 
comparing antimiscegenation laws to current marriage laws.274 By 
 265.  See id. (mentioning the position of Julian Bond); Lynette Clemetson, Both Sides 
Court Black Churches in the Battle Over Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2004, at A1 
(describing the position of the National Black Justice Coalition). 
 266.  See, e.g., Gay Marriage, Civil Rights Aren’t Linked, Some Blacks Say, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 30, 2003, at A4. 
 267.  See Michael Paulson, Black Clergy Rejection Stirs Gay Marriage Backers, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2004, at B1. 
 268.  Yvonne Abraham, Gay-Marriage Lobbying Builds: Activists on Both Sides 
Converge on State House for Crucial Session, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 2004, at B1. 
 269.  Ellen Barry, March Clouded by Stand on Gay Unions, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, 
at A18. 
 270.  See id. 
 271.  See Black Leaders Join Leno in Backing Gay Unions, SUN REP., Jan. 6, 2005, at 3.
 272.  See id.
 273.  908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006). 
 274.  See Brief Amicus Curiae and Appendix on Behalf of the National Black Justice 
Coalition at 1-3, Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (No. 58,389), available at
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2008 when the California Supreme Court was considering its own 
same-sex marriage case, amici on both sides claimed to speak for the 
civil rights movement and to understand the meaning of constitu-
tional equality.275
 An amicus brief submitted in that case by a group of African-
American pastors rejected the analogy that had been drawn in the 
National Black Justice Coalition’s Lewis brief, claiming that mar-
riage laws were “firmly rooted in the biology that defines human 
nature and reproduction.”276 To equate the civil rights and same-sex 
marriage movements, the brief argued, was to insult the African-
American community and to send “another unwelcome reminder that 
state and local government officials sometimes do not . . . have a firm 
grasp of the history that continues to shape the challenges that lie 
ahead for our communities.”277 Describing the antimiscegenation 
analogy as “deeply offensive” to the African-American community, 
the brief contended that it was only the advocates of same-sex mar-
riage who had made discriminatory arguments like those “that 
shaped the Supreme Court’s rulings in Dred Scott and Plessy v. 
Ferguson”—arguments that “denie[d] the relevance of human nature 
and biology.”278 Similarly, a brief submitted by the evangelical Cali-
fornia Ethnic Religious Organization for Marriage (CEROM) rejected 
the antimiscegenation analogy because marriage was not “a tool to 
promote invidious discrimination” but a way to reinforce the com-
mitment of a husband and wife “to one another and to the children 
they may create.”279
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 On the other side, amici for the California NAACP and a variety of 
minority rights organizations read antimiscegenation cases as pro-
hibiting the creation of separate institutions for disadvantaged 
groups. The California NAACP asserted that Goodridge had made 
the same “argument in favor of legalizing marriage by interracial 
couples . . . with words like ‘same-sex’ replac[ing] words like ‘interra-
cial.’ ”280 A variety of Hispanic and Asian organizations also endorsed 
the antimiscegenation analogy.281 In applying state equal protection 
analysis, one of these briefs pointed to the shared experiences of gays 
and minorities in facing the “stigma of inferiority,” “second-class citi-
zenship,” and “past discrimination.”282
 By making civil rights a central issue in the discussion of same-
sex marriage, Goodridge prompted civil rights leaders to take sides 
for the first time. By helping to present same-sex marriage primarily 
as an issue of constitutional equality, Goodridge also created coalition-
building opportunities for MGLPC and GLAD that had not been 
available before the decision.  
VI.   CONCLUSION
 Over the past year debate about the value of same-sex marriage 
litigation has intensified. Two successful suits, Perry and the consoli-
dated cases in Gill, have held unconstitutional important anti-same-
sex marriage laws. But even if the final outcome of these cases in the 
federal courts is favorable to the same-sex marriage movement, many 
critics suggest that the decision to litigate Perry and Gill was foolish. 
These commentators contend that the harm done by backlash will 
outweigh any potential benefits.  
 Many of these commentators rely on a particular historical narra-
tive of the impact of past litigation. According to this account, the lit-
igation of cases like Baker and Goodridge served primarily to produce 
backlash. Because of resistance to the decision, opponents of same-
sex marriage performed well at the polls and new state constitutional 
bans on same-sex marriage appeared. 
 However, the history on which these critics rely is incomplete. 
Baker and Goodridge not only produced backlash but also allowed 
some within the same-sex marriage movement to reshape the argu-
ments and coalitions that defined the same-sex marriage debate. Be-
fore the decisions, equality-based claims played a marginal role in 
the advocacy of major gay rights organizations like the Freedom to 
Marry Coalition and the Human Rights Campaign. When, before the 
 280.  See Brief of the California NAACP, supra note 275, at 11. 
 281.  See, e.g., Brief of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra 
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 282.  See id. at 14. 
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decisions, gay rights groups emphasized privacy- or equal-pay-based 
arguments, libertarian and labor organizations joined the call for le-
gal recognition of same-sex relationships. The opposition to same-sex 
marriage also used different rhetorical tactics before Goodridge.
Organizations like the TVC, Focus on the Family, and the Family 
Research Council emphasized claims about the illegitimacy of homo-
sexuality or the necessity of defending marriage. 
 Baker and, to a greater extent, Goodridge appear to have played 
an important role in changing the arguments and coalitions on either 
side of the debate. Both decisions highlighted equality-based reason-
ing and rhetoric. Gradually, as gay rights leaders adopted these 
claims, same-sex marriage was repackaged as an issue of civil rights. 
In the same period, in responding to Goodridge, opponents of same-
sex marriage stopped openly justifying the unequal treatment of 
gays. Instead, opposition organizations began claiming that the 
equality- and anti-discrimination concerns outlined in Goodridge
weighed in their favor.  
 The history of these decisions shows that same-sex marriage liti-
gation likely has had a more complex and profound impact than cur-
rent scholarship suggests. It is too early to determine whether the 
effects studied here will advance the same-sex marriage cause in the 
long term, but before scholars evaluate whether same-sex marriage 
litigation has harmed or helped the gay rights movement, they 
should account for all, not for some, of the effects of decisions like 
Baker and Goodridge. By refocusing discussion about gay marriage, 
these decisions allowed activists to alter the contentions and allianc-
es that shaped the struggle. In the future, in cases like Perry and 
Gill, the decision to pursue litigation may seem to be much wiser 
than many currently think. 
